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The Demise of the Hub-and-Spoke Cartel
and the Rise of the Student Athlete: A
Significant Step Toward a New Era of
Conferences in NCAA v. Alston
Brandon Posivak
The NCAA is not above the law. On June 21, 2021, the Supreme
Court unanimously held in NCAA v. Alston that the NCAA’s
student-athlete compensation restrictions violated § 1 of the
Sherman Act, and student athletes may now obtain educationrelated benefits from their name, image, and likeness (NIL). The
Court’s holding marked the first time the NCAA’s compensation
restrictions failed antitrust scrutiny under the Rule of Reason
analysis, but by limiting its holding to education-related benefits,
the Court refused to open the floodgates to all forms of NIL
compensation. Within its holding, the Court notably rejected the
NCAA’s procompetitive argument of preserving amateur
athletics, which had largely withstood judicial pressure for nearly
half a century.
While the Court found the NCAA’s compensation restrictions
amounted to horizontal restraints on the student-athlete
cognizable labor market as the NCAA engaged in blatant price
fixing, it is the NCAA’s enforcement of the restrictions rather than
the restrictions themselves that manifests the Sherman Act
violation. This Note argues that the NCAA should cede its control
over to the conferences comprised of its member institutions,
which would remedy the Sherman Act violation as the conferences
are in competition with each other, thus making the compensation
restrictions a reasonable restraint on trade. Significantly, Justice
Kavanaugh’s fiery concurrence in Alston implored the Court to
expand its holding to other areas of NIL compensation restrictions
outside education, which foreshadows that the Court’s decision in
38
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Alston may be essentially mark the end of the NCAA’s iron grip
on student athletes.
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INTRODUCTION: TEDDY ROOSEVELT’S ORIGINAL VISION FOR THE
NCAA CLOUDED BY ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS UNDER § 1 OF THE
SHERMAN ACT
Nowhere else in America can businesses get away with
agreeing not to pay their workers a fair market rate on the
theory that their product is defined by not paying their
workers a fair market rate, and under ordinary principles
of antitrust law, it is not evident why college sports should
be any different . . . .The NCAA is not above the law. 1
In NCAA v. Alston, the decades-long questions of whether student
athletes should receive monetary compensation for competing in their
respective collegiate sports and whether the National Collegiate Athletic
Association’s (“NCAA”) reimbursement restrictions for student athletes
were justifiably valid under its amateurism infrastructure came before the
Supreme Court. 2 Formed in 1906, the NCAA is a non-profit organization
that constitutes the major governing body for intercollegiate athletics of
over 1,200 colleges and universities around the United States. 3 The NCAA
NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2169 (2021) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); see also
Marcia Coyle, ‘The NCAA is Not Above the Law’: Justice Kavanaugh Invites More Student
Athlete Pay Challenges, THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL (June 21, 2021),
https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2021/06/21/the-ncaa-is-not-above-the-lawjustice-kavanaugh-invites-more-student-athlete-pay-challenges/?slreturn=202205231457
19; see also infra Part V (emphasizing that Justice Kavanaugh in his concurrence to the
Alston opinion went the furthest of any of his colleagues on the bench in vocalizing that
the NCAA’s restrictions on student athletes were clear price fixing, a violation of § 1 of
the Sherman Act, and the Court’s decision should extend past just an application to
educational benefits for student athletes); Sean Gregory, Why the NCAA Should Be
Terrified of Supreme Court Justice Kavanaugh’s Concurrence, TIME (June 21, 2021, 6:24
PM), https://time.com/6074583/ncaa-supreme-court-ruling/ (emphasizing that Justice
Kavanaugh’s concurrence serves as somewhat of a rallying cry for student athletes and
those who wish to see their NIL rights expanded as well as a possible sign of things to
come if another similar case involving NCAA antitrust violations and student athletes NIL
rights were to ascend to the Supreme Court level).
2
See generally Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2141 (noting that not only were the student athletes
attempting to claim ownership over their NIL, but the NCAA was also imploring the Court
to exempt the organization from antitrust scrutiny due to its status as a joint venture). See
also Piraino, infra note 131 and accompanying text.
3
Justin Berkman, What Are NCAA Divisions? Division 1 vs 2 vs 3, PREPSCHOLAR (Oct.
23, 2021, 11:27 AM), https://blog.prepscholar.com/what-are-ncaa-divisions-1-vs-2-vs-3
(explaining that the majority of NCAA content that is broadcast on television consists of
Division I competitions, while Division II and Division III schools have lower athletic
budgets and smaller fan bases). Berkman further breaks down the differences between the
divisions by noting that the 350 Division I schools that produce more than 6,000 teams
consisting of over 170,000 student athletes generally have the largest student bodies,
biggest athletic budgets, and the widest range in providing athletic scholarships. Id. To this
1
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contains over 1,000 voting members classified into separate and distinct
divisions based on their variations in the size and scope of their athletic
programs. 4 After establishing its vast intercollegiate infrastructure in the
early twentieth century, the NCAA has rapidly grown to implement and
enforce its rules for its member institutions carrying over into the twentyfirst century. 5 As its rules and infrastructure continued to evolve, the
NCAA came to be known by its engagement in two distinct kinds of
rulemaking activity in its governance of student athletes, with one type
“rooted in the NCAA’s concern for the protection of amateurism” and “the
other type [] increasingly accompanied by a discernible economic
purpose.” 6
Per its 2021 Mission Statement, the NCAA breaks down its mission
of “integrat[ing] intercollegiate athletics into higher education so that the
educational experience of the student athlete is paramount” into two
components: advancing sports and improving lives. 7 This first component
point, even smaller Division I schools have been able to reach the national spotlight, such
as Butler University, a small, relatively unknown school in Indianapolis, Indiana, that rose
to fame by reaching the NCAA’s men’s Division I basketball playoff finals in 2010 and
received $639 million from the publicity. Id. For Division II, there are approximately 300
schools, which all offer athletic scholarships, but in comparison to Division I, these are
usually partial and smaller scholarships due to the small athletic department budgets at
schools such as Valdosta State University and University of West Florida. Id. Lastly,
Division III, which is the largest of all NCAA divisions and contains 444 schools with
more than 170,000 student athletes, does not provide any athletic scholarships, while
student athletes more commonly receive academic or need-based aid at schools such as
Babson College and University of Rochester. Id.
4
See generally Schools, NCAA.COM, https://www.ncaa.com/schools-index (last visited
Oct. 10, 2022) (listing out every NCAA member school across all divisions in an
alphabetically organized list); see also Our Division I Members, NCAA.ORG,
https://www.ncaa.org/sports/2021/5/11/our-division-i-members.aspx (last visited Oct. 10,
2022) (providing a visual map of the location of all 358 Division I member schools, which
frequently garner national media attention and mass fandom across the country).
5
See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 90 (1984) (explaining
that the NCAA, throughout the course of the twentieth century has continuously tightened
its iron grip on student athletes, notable ramping up its restrictions and regulations on
student athletes to avoid the designation of a dummy organization with no real enforcement
power).
6
Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 383 (D. Ariz. 1983) (describing that student-athletes
from the University of Arizona brought an antitrust claim under § 1 of the Sherman Act
against the NCAA to prevent enforcement of the NCAA’s sanctions on the school’s
football team that made the team ineligible to participate in post-season competition in the
1983 and 1984 seasons or to make television appearances in the 1984 and 1985 seasons).
Coming only one year before the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Board of Regents,
Justice v. NCAA is a notable precursor to student athletes’ pursuit to hold the NCAA
accountable for its antitrust violations in the late twentieth century and twenty-first century.
See generally Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 89.
7
NCAA Mission and Vision Statements Analysis, MISSION STATEMENT, https://missionstatement.com/ncaa/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2022) (noting that the NCAA’s core values
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of advancing sports focuses on facilitating student athletes’ discovery and
development of their athletic potential in college with the ultimate goal of
students becoming successful individuals either inside or outside the
sports world. 8 To this end, the NCAA even boasts the slogan that their
student athletes “go pro in something other than sports,” as only two
percent of student athletes will ascend to professional status. 9 This notion
promoted by the NCAA goes hand in hand with their second component
of improving lives. 10 In addition to providing the opportunity to expand
their athletic horizons, the NCAA strives to prepare its student athletes for
future careers that will have a positive social impact on the world,
stemming from the skills they learned and honed as student athletes. 11
As it grew in power and recognition throughout the twentieth century,
the NCAA repeatedly set forth a procompetitive “amateurism” argument
in response to heavy-bodied blows from challenges brought by student

consist of “well-being, fairness, integrity, and teamwork” and that to achieve the NCAA’s
vision and objectives of prioritizing education as well as athletic success, it requires a
supportive environment for its student athletes to grow and develop). In addition to its
mission statement, the NCAA’s vision statement, though not official, revolves around a
devotion to the “overall wellness and success of the collegiate athletes,” which extends
beyond their academic and athletic performance to their overall health and wellness. Id.
Both the NCAA’s mission and vision statements “consider the experiences and
opportunities of young athletes [to help them achieve] the most important [] conventional
education.” Id. The NCAA boasts that for over a century, it has demonstrated its corporate
capability and precision in organizing ninety championships across approximately twentyfour sports that fall into three distinct divisions. Id.
8
See id.; see also Debbie Morrison, College-Athletes Under Pressure, SCHOOL OVER
SPORTS (Mar. 3, 2016), https://schooloversports.wordpress.com/category/ncaa/
(explaining that the NCAA attempts to alleviate the major sources of pressure on its
student-athletes: pressure from parents, youth sports culture, college teams, coaches, and
the media by providing student athletes with necessary resources to develop).
9
Ruth Williams, What Percentage of College Basketball Players Go Pro?,
BASKETBALL CLASSIC, https://surreybasketballclassic.info/interesting/what-percentage-ofcollege-basketball-players-go-pro.html (breaking down the two percent of the more than
460,000 NCAA student athletes moving on to play at the professional level in their
respective sport, and highlighting that only 1.2% of the 18,816 men’s college basketball
players, 0.8% of the 16,509 women’s college basketball players, and 1.6% of the 73,712
college football players will move on to play professionally at the next level).
10
See NCAA Mission and Vision Statements Analysis, supra note 7 (touching on the
importance of the NCAA proliferating its message of improving student athlete’s lives on
and off the field to show the general public that the organization works outside of the
athletic realm as well).
11
See Williams, supra note 9 (furthering, again, the NCAA’s slogan of its student
athletes “go[ing] pro in something other than sports” and showing the rest of the nation
that the NCAA’s organizational motivation is to produce productive and well-rounded
citizens in society beyond any athletic benefit that student athletes receive while playing
collegiate sports).
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athletes seeking monetary compensation for their play. 12 Despite never
sustaining an officially recognized definition for “amateur,” the NCAA’s
amateurism argument largely survived judicial scrutiny until NCAA v.
Alston. 13 Lead by former West Virginia University running back Shawne
Alston and University of California, Berkeley center Justine Hartman as lead
plaintiffs, a class of former male and female student athletes filed their
original complaint in 2014 challenging the NCAA’s restriction on student
athletes monetizing their NIL. 14 Almost seven years later in 2021, the
Supreme Court unanimously found for Alston, Hartman, and their fellow
former student athlete plaintiffs in a 9-0 decision, which signified the
culmination of strenuous years of antitrust litigation by the NCAA and a
fervent push for the expansion of economic rights for student athletes. 15
This Note argues that the Court’s narrow holding in Alston—the only
ruling on the NCAA’s restriction on student athletes’ education-related
benefits such as post-eligibility scholarships at graduate or vocational
schools—should be expanded to eliminate the NCAA’s overarching
restraints on student athletes profiting from their NIL. 16 This expansion
excludes illegal activities such as bribery or intentionally throwing a game
for profit and falls in accordance with Justice Kavanaugh’s vehement
12
See discussion infra Part II.A (laying out the string of important cases leading up to
the Court’s decision in Alston and emphasizing that the NCAA repeatedly has used its
amateurism argument throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries to defend against
antitrust actions from student athletes).
13
See discussion infra Part III.A (highlighting that unlike the International Olympic
Committee, the NCAA’s definition of amateur has continued to evolve and does not have
a recognizable or discernible definition for the term).
14
See Hannah Holmes, NCAA v. Alston at the Supreme Court, HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT.
L.: HIGHLIGHTS (Apr. 20, 2021), https://harvardjsel.com/2021/04/ncaa-v-alston-at-thesupreme-court/ (dissecting the circumstances leading to the Alston decision, the arguments
of both the NCAA and student athletes, the nine Supreme Court Justices’ questions to each
side, and an overview of each side’s argument before the Justices).
15
See Michael Smith, U.S. Supreme Court Issues Unanimous Decision Against NCAA, SPORTS
BUS. J. (June 21, 2021), https://news.sportsbusinessjournal.com/Daily/Issues/2021/06/21/
Colleges/Alston.aspx (noting that the Supreme Court’s narrow decision involving the
education-related benefits of student athletes may possibly “come in the form of
postgraduate scholarships, financial awards for academic achievements, paid internships,
study abroad and laptops or other education-related items, any of which could be used in
the recruiting process to attract prospective college athletes”); see also Caroline Rice,
Supreme Court Unanimously Rules Against NCAA in NCAA v. Alston, THE OZONE (Jun.
21, 2021), https://theozone.net/2021/06/supreme-court-unanimously-rules-ncaa-ncaa-valston/ (clarifying that student athletes will not automatically receive monetary
compensation as a result of the Alston decision but rather that “[i]nstitutions can [now]
decide how much they want to give student-athletes beyond their athletic scholarships”).
16
See discussion infra Part III.B (explaining that while the Court decided to construe its
holding narrowly, the Alston decision now serves as a beacon for student athletes to
continue submitting antitrust claims against the NCAA to further expand their NIL rights).
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argument in his Alston concurrence for an expansion of the majority’s
holding past education-related benefits for student athletes.17 To clarify,
the NCAA itself, rather than its compensation restraints on student
athletes, is the source of the antitrust violation via § 1 of the Sherman
Act 18, and this Note sets forth the argument that the conferences are better
suited to set such restraints on student athletes rather than the NCAA. 19
The overarching antitrust question from Alston Court concerned
whether, under § 1 of the Sherman Act, the NCAA’s compensation
restrictions on student athletes amounted to an unreasonable restraint on
trade. 20 The Court’s focus on the NCAA’s antitrust violations does not
extend to the conferences because the student athletes are a product of the
universities and their respective conferences, not the NCAA itself. 21 The
Court did not want to blow up the entire dam of the NCAA’s constraints
over student-athlete compensation in its Alston decision; instead, it drilled
a hole in the dam by focusing the decision solely on education-related
benefits. 22 But the dam should be blown up altogether, and the NCAA
should cede its control over compensation restraints to the conferences. 23
The conferences that comprise the NCAA 24 are in direct competition with
each other in a cognizable labor market, which wards off the antitrust
violations that the NCAA is currently committing as a hub-and-spoke

17
See discussion infra Part III.C (emphasizing that Justice Kavanaugh took the most
aggressive approach of his colleagues on the bench against the NCAA and noted in his
concurrence that the Court should extend student athletes’ NIL benefits past the education
realm, which the Court ultimately settled on).
18
15 U.S.C. § 1 [hereinafter § 1 of the Sherman Act] (prohibiting “[e]very contract,
combination . . . , or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce”).
19
See discussion infra Part VI.
20
See discussion infra Part VI.
21
See discussion infra Part VI.
22
See discussion infra Part III.A.
23
See discussion infra Part VI.
24
List of NCAA Conferences, AM. FOOTBALL DATABASE, https://americanfootball
database.fandom.com/wiki/List_of_NCAA_conferences (last visited Oct. 10, 2022)
(listing out the twelve FBS conferences, including the four schools designated in the FBS
Independent category that are not a member of any specific FBS conference and noting
that the Big East Conference (Big East) transitioned into the American Athletic Conference
(AAC) in 2013, as well as the fourteen FCS conferences, including the two schools
designated as FCS Independents).

2022]

THE DEMISE OF THE HUB-AND-SPOKE CARTEL

45

cartel 25. 26 Conferences should each be able to set their own rules absent
NCAA restrictions or oversight with the exception of the collective
decision making necessary for deciding scheduling and broadcasting
rights. 27
Part II.A provides an overview of the NCAA antitrust case precedent
from the past half-century, and Part II.B discusses the numerous states
which have passed “Fair Pay to Play Acts” 28 through their respective
legislatures leading up to the Alston decision. 29 Part III.A offers an indepth dive into Alston’s facts and the Rule of Reason analysis at the district
court level, and Part III.B delves into the Court’s stout rejection of the
NCAA’s amateurism argument. The Court debunks the argument as a
justification for the NCAA’s hub-and-spoke cartel operation and
highlighting that its unique infrastructure has survived on an ambiguous
model unsupported in any other business or industry. 30 Part III.C further
explores the Court’s rejection of the NCAA’s viewership argument
through Justice Kavanaugh’s fiery concurrence attacking the NCAA headon for its NCAA’s antitrust violations under § 1 of the Sherman Act. 31 Part
IV explores the Rule of Reason analysis and why American Needle, Inc.
v. National Football League exposes the NCAA’s price fixing and
horizontal restraints on competition by restricting the quantity of its
25

See generally Aditya Goyal & Shreya Chandhok, Hub and Spoke Cartels: A
Perspective on Future Investigations, INDIACORPLAW (July 10, 2020), https://india
corplaw.in/2020/07/hub-and-spoke-cartels-a-perspective-on-future-investigations.html
(defining a hub-and-spoke cartel as one where “market players at the horizontal level
(spokes) enter into an agreement, tacit or explicit, to share sensitive information through a
vertical common player, referred to as ‘hub’. Although not directly involved in its
activities, the hub act as a medium to facilitate the cartel. There are transfers of information
from the spokes to the hub, which is then used by the other spokes; hence, an information
exchange mechanism is formed which facilitates cartel formation.”).
26
See generally JANE E. RUSEKI, ET AL., COMPETITION AMONG ATHLETIC CONFERENCES
FOR NEW MEMBERS: EVIDENCE FROM NCAA SPORTS (2018), https://web.holycross.edu/Re
PEc/fek/Session04.3-Reilly.pdf (examining how NCAA conferences value their respective
program rankings and program popularity when deciding whether to add a new member to
their conference).
27
See discussion infra Part VI.
28
Jenna West, What Is the Proposed Calif. Bill to Pay NCAA Athletes? Fair Pay to Play
Act Explained., SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.si.com/college/2019/
09/10/fair-pay-play-act-california-bill-ncaa-background-explainer (explaining that the
California State Assembly unanimously voted the Fair Pay to Play Act into law, which
made it illegal for California Universities to revoke an athlete’s scholarship or eligibility
for taking money). The phrase “Fair Pay to Play” was subsequently applied to other states’
NIL-based legislation as a slogan representative of the student athletes’ movement against
the NCAA to remove its compensation restrictions.
29
See discussion infra Part II.A. and Part II.B.
30
See discussion infra Part III.A and Part III.B.
31
See discussion infra Part III.C.
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product within a cognizable labor market to raise the price and show
market power over its product. 32 Part V analyzes the societal impact and
significance of a new conference-driven competitive model absent the
NCAA in expanding upon Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence in Alston to
eliminate all restrictions for student athletes profiting off their NIL. 33 Part
VI summarizes and concludes. 34

I. THE CONJUNCTIVE LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL PUSH THROUGH
ANTITRUST LITIGATION AND FAIR PAY TO PLAY LEGISLATION THAT
LEAD TO THE ALSTON DECISION
A. The Antitrust War That Waged for Decades Before the Alston
Decision
At the beginning of the twentieth century, President Theodore
Roosevelt, a Harvard University football fan and graduate, convened a
meeting to review the rules of college football with Harvard, Princeton,
and Yale as a result of an increasing number of on-field player deaths due
to the violence and brutality of the sport as well as inadequate safety
gear. 35 The meeting saw the inception of the NCAA as the standardsetting body of collegiate sports, which in addition to increasing the health
and safety of players, set out that no student shall represent a college or
university in intercollegiate contests who is monetarily compensated.36
Yet this admonition did little to prevent the commercialism of collegiate
football and the intervention of affluent alumni in paying athletes to play

See discussion infra Part IV.
See discussion infra Part V.
34
See discussion infra Part VI.
35
See NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2148 (2021) (explaining that in addition to
discussing player safety, President Roosevelt wanted to maintain the purity of college
football, which was falling victim to schools hiring players outside their college or
university as “ringers” to play for their team on the field).
36
Id. at 2149–50 (quoting Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States
Constitution By-Laws, Art. VII, § 3 (1906)) (noting the pure intentions behind the
inception of the NCAA at its origin in attempting to dispel the corruption and bribery that
plagued collegiate football in the early twentieth century); see also Christopher Klein, How
Teddy Roosevelt Saved Football, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/news/how-teddyroosevelt-saved-football (last updated July 21, 2019) (elaborating on the content of the
meeting between President Teddy Roosevelt and Harvard, Princeton, and Yale where a
representative from each school agreed to draft an agreement stating they would “play by
the letter and the spirit of the established rules of football,” which eventually lead to the
creation of the NCAA as a regulatory body for collegiate athletics).
32
33
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their respective sport. 37 Colleges and universities also began competing to
provide the highest pecuniary incentives 38 to entice players to attend their
institutions and wear their colors. 39
After more than four decades of this commercialism and blatant
disregard for the NCAA’s compensation admonition, the NCAA adopted
the “Sanity Code” in 1948, which set out two clear-cut, important points;
first, the NCAA committed to opposing “promised pay in any form” to
student athletes, and second, it authorized colleges and universities to pay
student athlete’s tuition in the form of a grant-in-aid scholarship. 40 Since
its codification, the Sanity Code has evolved over time by “expand[ing]
the scope of allowable payments to room, board, books, fees, and ‘cash for
incidental expenses such as laundry’ 41; permitting paid professionals in
one sport to compete on an amateur basis in another sport; 42 and most
recently, allowing “athletic conferences to authorize their member schools
to increase scholarships up to the full cost of attendance.” 43
37
See Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2149-50 (noting the pure intentions behind the inception of
the NCAA at its origin in attempting to dispel the corruption and bribery that plagued
collegiate football in the early twentieth century).
38
See, e.g., Kelly Charles Crabb, The Amateurism Myth: A Case for a New Tradition,
28 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 181, 190 (2017) (noting that in 1939, due to a discrepancy in the
money they were receiving from the school, freshmen student athletes at the University of
Pittsburgh decided to go on strike because they were angered that their upperclassmen
teammates were reportedly earning more money than them for playing in games).
39
See Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2149 (noting the threat of the wealthy schools dominating
collegiate sports simply because they could afford to pay their players more than other
schools and entice more recruits to attend their college or university with the promise of
significant pecuniary benefits).
40
Id.; see also Lee VanHorn, When the Sanity Code Becomes the Insanity Code:
Following O’Bannon’s Lead is the Key to Solving Group Licensing for NCAA StudentAthletes, 74 ARK. L. REV. 117, 127 (2021) (quoting NCAA, Division I Manual § 12.1.2
(2020)) (elaborating on the strictness of the Sanity Code as the NCAA dictated that student
athletes would forfeit their eligibility if they “[u]se[d] [their] athletics skill (directly or
indirectly) for pay in any form in th[eir] sport,” or “[e]nter[ed] into an agreement with an
agent”).
41
Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2149 (quoting In re. NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust
Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1063 (N.D. Cal. 2019)) (explaining the practicality of the
NCAA’s leniency over time on this specific point to maintain the image in the public eye
that it is still promoting the welfare of student athletes by helping them paying for their
own laundry).
42
See id. (citing Brief for Historians as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 10,
Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (No. 20-152)) (noting the difference between professionals in one
sport playing on an amateur or recreational basis in another sport and schools bringing in
“ringers” in the early twentieth century to boost their team’s chances of winning on the
football field).
43
Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2150 (quoting O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1054–1055
(9th Cir. 2015)) (emphasizing the more recent development of schools covering the full
cost of grant-in-aid tuition for student athletes, which allowed student athletes from poorer
backgrounds to attend schools they normally would not be able to afford on their own).
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Before delving into the trajectory of cases analyzing the NCAA’s
alleged violations of the Sherman Act that ultimately culminated with the
Alston decision, it is first important to explain the relevance of the
Sherman Act to the issue of student athletes’ NIL. 44 The Sherman Act—
Congress’ first antitrust law in 1890—was designed to be a
“comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and
unfettered competition as the rule of trade.” 45 In determining the scope of
the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court made clear that the legislation does
not prohibit every restraint of trade but rather those restraints that are
deemed unreasonable upon inspection and analysis. 46 The Supreme Court
further clarified the Act’s reach by opining that there are certain types of
acts that are considered to be so harmful to competition that they are per
se violations, including, but not limited to, plain arrangements between
competing entities or individuals to fix prices, rig bids, or divide markets. 47
Paralleling the severity of an action that is deemed a per se Sherman Act
violation, the accompanying penalties are also severe when competitors
fix prices or engage in horizontal restraints on power, which are the
specific Sherman Act violations at issue in the Alston decision and its
progeny. 48

44
See The Antitrust Laws, infra note 45 and accompanying text (explaining the
importance and relevance of the Sherman Act to prevent the monopolization of key
industries and business sectors with one corporation bullying its competitors into
compliance merely because it possessed the capital liquidity and ability to do so).
45
The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/
competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Oct. 10, 2022)
(explaining that the Sherman Act and the other core antitrust laws, the FTC Act and the
Clayton Act, have possessed the same basic objective for over 100 years since they were
enacted by Congress: “to protect the process of competition for the benefit of consumers,
making sure there are strong incentives for businesses to operate efficiently, keep prices
down, and keep quality up”).
46
Id. (clarifying the Supreme Court’s stance on Sherman Act violations was important
for businesses and corporate entities to understand the boundaries and restrictions on their
ability to restrain trade and what may be considered “unreasonable” in a specific
circumstance).
47
See generally United States v. Socony-Vaccum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 213 (1940)
(quoting United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927)); The
Sherman Antitrust Act, GIBBS LAW GROUP LLP, https://www.classlawgroup.com/antitrust/
federal-laws/sherman-act (last visited Oct. 10, 2022) (listing examples of per se Sherman
Act violations as monopolies, tying, exclusive dealings, and price discrimination that all
amount to unreasonable restraints on trade).
48
See id. (applying the Sherman Act violation of fixing prices and horizontally
restraining trade to the student athlete context with the NCAA as the NCAA is
unreasonably restricting the cognizable labor market of student athletes by not paying them
for their performance on the field). See generally Judy Beckner Sloan, Antitrust: Shared
Information Between the FTC and the Department of Justice, 1979 BYU L. REV. 883, 885.
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While the Supreme Court’s decision in Alston validated the decadeslong struggle for student athletes in their war against the NCAA for
monetizing their NIL, this dispute first ascended to national recognition in
1984 in National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of
the University of Oklahoma (NCAA v. Board of Regents). 49 There, the
Court sustained an antitrust challenge brought by the University of
Oklahoma and University of Georgia to the NCAA’s restraints on
televising collegiate games. 50 In the early 1980s, the NCAA monopolized
college football TV contracts, controlling the number of times a school’s
football games could be televised nationally and regionally in addition to
the amount of revenue the school would receive from each NCAA
broadcast. 51 The NCAA implemented a stringent restriction that no school
was eligible to appear on a televised broadcast exceeding a maximum of
four times nationally and six times in total over a two-year term. 52
While the NCAA justified its broadcasting restrictions by claiming
reduced adverse effects of live television upon football game attendance,
the universities claimed the NCAA’s restrictions violated § 1 of the
Sherman Act through horizontal price fixing and output limitation. 53 The
NCAA v. Bd. Of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984). The University of
Oklahoma and University of Georgia’s eventual victory in Board of Regents set into motion
a series of antitrust suits by student athletes over the coming decades once the world saw
that the NCAA was not immune to judicial oversight. See generally id. at 88–89.
50
Id. at 88 (noting that the University of Oklahoma and the University of Georgia were
both powerhouse competitive football schools who were negatively impacted by the
NCAA’s broadcasting restraints and who would stand to benefit significantly from more
nationally televised games absent such restraints).
51
See Seven Cases That Shaped Sports Since 1977, ATHLETIC BUS. (Apr. 13,
2017),
https://www.athleticbusiness.com/operations/legal/article/15149636/sevencases-that-shaped-sports-since-1977 (describing that NCAA v. Board of Regents is one
of the most significant sports-related cases to ever make it to the Supreme Court level
where student athletes were able to secure a victory as its impact on the broadcasting
rights of collegiate sports still reverberates into the twenty-first century). Similarly,
the second case on the list is O’Bannon v. NCAA, which became one of the most
important antitrust class action suits challenging the NCAA’s amateurism model in
the twentieth century. See id; supra Part II.A.
52
Seven Cases That Shaped Sports Since 1977, supra note 51.; see also Thomas Scully,
NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma: The NCAA’s Television Plan
is Sacked by the Sherman Act, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 857, 870 (1985) (relaying that within
the Court’s decision to invalidate the NCAA’s television practices as horizontal restraints
on competition, the Court found that the NCAA had “established an artificial limit on
output and had unreasonably restricted trade” in setting its cap on the number of games
available to be televised and its limitations on broadcasting). Moreover, “the NCAA “had
effectively eliminated any broadcaster-institution negotiation” with its minimum aggregate
price, which lead the Court to find the NCAA’s actions as blatant price-fixing. Id.
53
See Scully, supra note 52, at 870; see also Gabriel A. Feldman, The Misuse of the
Less Restrictive Alternative Inquiry in Rule of Reason Analysis, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 561,
627 (2009) (describing that the Court in Board of Regents significantly did not hold that
49
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Supreme Court agreed with the universities, finding that the NCAA’s
broadcasting restrictions constituted an unlawful restraint on free market
operations that violated § 1 of the Sherman Act. 54
In applying the Rule of Reason analysis, there is a four step burdenshifting framework. 55 First, a plaintiff must show a significant
anticompetitive effect. 56 Second, the defendant must “demonstrate a
legitimate procompetitive justification.” 57 Third, the plaintiff must
“demonstrate that the restraint is not reasonably necessary to achieve the
restraint’s objectives.” 58 Fourth, “the court [must] balance[] the restraint’s
anticompetitive and procompetitive effects.” 59 Applying the Rule of
Reason analysis in Board of Regents, the Court struck down the NCAA’s
television broadcasting rules because they did not serve any legitimate
procompetitive purpose, noting that “consistent with the Sherman Act, the
role of the NCAA must be to preserve a tradition that might otherwise die;
rules that restrict output are hardly consistent with this role.” 60 Although
the NCAA’s television plan was illegal because of the existence of potential less restrictive
alternatives, but the Court did make clear that the presence of such alternatives provided
proof that the NCAA’s procompetitive justifications for its restrictions were merely pretext
while the real purpose and intent behind the restrictions was to notably raise prices and
reduce output while still turning a notable profit).
54
See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 at 120 (discussing that the Court focused heavily on
the procompetitive factor of the Rule of Reason analysis to assess whether the NCAA could
offset the anticompetitive limitation on price and output caused by their broadcasting
restrictions that the Court identified under the anticompetitive factor).
55
See Michael A. Carrier, The Four-Step Rule of Reason, ANTITRUST 50 (Spring 2019),
(explaining that the Rule of Reason analysis is used as the primary framework in the
majority of antitrust cases where the courts employ a four-step test to assess the effects of
a particular individual or corporation’s restraint on competition).
56
Id. at 50 (explaining that the initial burden of proof is logically placed on the plaintiff
to essentially show the basis for their claim in bringing forth the harmful anticompetitive
effects resulting from the defendant’s actions or policies).
57
Id. (illustrating that the burden of proof then shifts from the plaintiff to the defendant
for the second Rule of Reason factor as the defendant is afforded the opportunity to show
that despite any potential anticompetitive effects, its procompetitive justifications make
their actions proper and in compliance with federal antitrust law).
58
Id. at 50-51 (noting that the burden of proof once again shifts back to the plaintiff for
the third Rule of Reason factor where the plaintiff has the opportunity to present the court
with less restrictive alternatives that the defendant would have been able to take that could
have mitigated or eliminated its anticompetitive effects on the relevant labor market).
59
Id. at 51 (explaining that the final step of the Rule of Reason analysis, the balancing
portion, is where the Court assesses the first three factors holistically and provides a
determination as to whether the defendant’s procompetitive justifications outweigh the
plaintiff’s harm from the defendant’s anticompetitive effects).
60
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984) (expanding
upon its analysis in regard to the other Rule of Reason factors, the Court noted the NCAA’
naked restriction on broadcasting rights operated to raise price and reduce output, which
were both unresponsive to consumer preference). The Court rejected the NCAA’s
argument that its television plan did not have a significant anticompetitive effect since the
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the Court did not delve into the lawfulness of the NCAA’s restrictions on
student-athlete compensation or rule on the merits of the NCAA’s
amateurism rules as they were not relevant to the Court’s antitrust analysis,
it did explain why the NCAA’s amateurism rules “should be analyzed
under the Rule of Reason, rather than held to be illegal per se.” 61
From a macro perspective, the impact of the Board of Regents Court
stripping the NCAA of a major funding source in its broadcasting rights
and supplying it to the universities sent a reverberating impact throughout
college sports that would change the trajectory of the NCAA’s relationship
with its member institutions. 62 In the wake of the Board of Regents
decision, universities entered into their own television contracts. 63 Some
universities switched conferences, conferences created their own branded
television networks, salaries increased for coaches and administrators, and
the Bowl Championship Series and the College Football Playoff
eventually emerged. 64 But one phrase buried deep within the dicta of
organization has no market power and found substantial evidence to the contrary. Id. at 94.
The Court similarly struck down the NCAA’s justification that the broadcasting plan
protected live attendance at NCAA sporting events and noted that “by seeking to insulate
live ticket sales from the full spectrum of competition because of its assumption that the
product itself is insufficiently attractive to draw live attendance when faced with
competition from televised games,” the NCAA’s argument goes sits inconsistent with the
basic tenets of the Sherman Act. Id.
61
O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1063 (9th Cir. 2015) (describing the Ninth
Circuit’s response and ultimate rejection of the NCAA’s claims that under the Board of
Regents decision, the NCAA amateurism rules in their entirety were deemed “valid as a
matter of law” and that any challenge brought under § 1 of the Sherman Act must fail as a
matter of law because the Court held in Board of Regents that they were presumptively
valid).
62
See Mary H. Tolbert & D. Kent Meyers, The Lasting Impact of NCAA v. Bd. of Regents
of the University of Oklahoma: The Football Fan Wins, OKLA. BAR J. 22, 25 (Oct. 2018),
(explaining that with universities winning their own television contracts and the NCAA
relinquishing its broadcasting rights, the impact of the Board of Regents decision “has
resulted in more improvement for consumer welfare than any other privately brought
antitrust case”).
63
See e.g. Longhorn Network, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Longhorn_
Network (Sept. 26, 2022, 11:13 PM) (providing an example of a prominent university, the
University of Texas at Austin, who owns a highly-viewed multinational regional sports
network—the Longhorn Network (LHN)—as a joint venture with ESPN and IMG
College); Dennis Brown, Notre Dame and NBC Extend Football Contract to 2025, NOTRE
DAME NEWS (Apr. 18, 2013), https://news.nd.edu/news/notre-dame-and-nbc-extendfootball-contract-to-2025/ (illustrating that the University of Notre Dame, which is an FBS
Independent school that does not belong to any one conference, and NBC Sports agreed to
a ten-year contract extension that gave NBC Sports the rights to televise Notre Dame home
football games from 2016 through 2025, which built upon the already existing partnership
that Notre Dame and NBC Sports first cultivated in 1991).
64
See generally Jon Solomon, NCAA Supreme Court Ruling Felt at O’Bannon Trial 30
Years Later, CBS SPORTS (June 26, 2014, 7:12 AM), https://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/news/ncaa-supreme-court-ruling-felt-at-obannon-trial-30-years-later/
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Board of Regents would haunt opponents of the NCAA’s student-athlete
compensation regulations for the next few decades: “[i]n order to preserve
the character and quality of the ‘product,’ athletes must not be paid.” 65
Fifteen years later, in Law v. NCAA, the Tenth Circuit built upon
Board of Regents and further opined that the NCAA had engaged in a
horizontal agreement to fix prices, which has obvious anticompetitive
effects, and per the Rule of Reason analysis, the NCAA was unable to
meet its burden in showing that its restraint on college coaches’ pay
reasonably enhances competition. 66 Judge Ebel of the Tenth Circuit
summarily rejected the NCAA’s justification that the price fixing will
allow younger, less experienced coaches to break into Division I coaching
openings. 67 Judge Ebel further rejected the NCAA’s additional
justifications of cutting overall coaching costs and maintaining
competitive equity by preventing schools with larger endowments from
placing a more experienced coach in an entry-level position. 68 Ultimately,
the NCAA settled with the collection of college coaches to the tune of $67
million in back pay, serving as another important chink in the NCAA’s
armor that eventually lead up to the Court’s eventual decision in Alston. 69
(emphasizing that the late Supreme Court Justice White, a former NFL player, predicted
the NCAA’s commercialization, defections for television cash, and its mighty struggle to
protect student athlete amateurism in his dissent in the Board of Regents case where he
famously stated “[b]y mitigating what appears to be a clear failure of the free market to
serve the ends and goals of higher education, the NCAA ensures the continued availability
of a unique and valuable product, the very existence of which might well be threatened by
unbridled competition in the economic sphere” (quoting Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 122
(White, J., dissenting))).
65
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 at 102 (discussing that the NCAA relied on this specific
quoted language in the Court’s dicta). This language would later be used by the NCAA in
antitrust litigation to come in the twentieth and twenty-first century, including eventually
in Alston.
66
Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1020 (10th Cir. 1998).
67
See id. at 1021–24. Judge Ebel’s overall rejection of the NCAA’s price fixing
justification set the tone for the remainder of the opinion as Judge Ebel went on to reject
the NCAA’s additional justifications, which eventually pushed the NCAA to agree to a
substantial multi-million-dollar settlement with the collection of coaches. See id. at 102122.
68
See id. at 1022-23. It is significant that Judge Ebel not only rejected the NCAA’s main
argument of price fixing allowing younger coaches to enter Division I, but also rejected
the NCAA’s ancillary arguments because it emphasizes that the NCAA found itself
essentially on the losing side of major antitrust litigation for the first time since the Board
of Regents decision in 1984. See id.
69
See NCAA Restricted Earning Coaches Rule, COLLEGE SPORTS SCHOLARSHIPS,
https://www.collegesportsscholarships.com/ncaa-coach-restricted-earnings.htm
(last
visited Oct. 10, 2022) (noting that the NCAA’s settlement with the collection of college
coaches in Law would serve as a dark mark on the NCAA’s record for decades to come as
antitrust litigation from student athletes continued to pour in throughout the twenty-first
century).
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Eight years later in 2006, the issue of student-athlete compensation
rose to the national stage once again. 70 In White v. NCAA, a collection of
student athletes challenged the NCAA on antitrust grounds to recover
damages for the difference between the full cost of their attendance and
the NCAA’s athletic scholarships (i.e. tuition, fees, room and board, and
books). 71 The NCAA limited its definition of a “full grant-in-aid athletic
scholarship” to tuition, mandatory fees, room, board, and required
books—which cumulatively was less than the cost of attendance due to
optional fees, school supplies, and other miscellaneous expenses. 72 For
many student athletes, the pecuniary difference between the full cost of
attendance and full grant-in-aid scholarship money provided by the school
ranged from $1,500-$6,000 depending on the school’s geographic
location. 73
The student athletes in White alleged that the NCAA and its member
institutions were parties to a horizontal agreement,74 limiting studentathlete compensation to grant-in aid scholarships and denying them of
their legitimate shares of the financial benefits in the labor markets of
college football and basketball. 75 With the NCAA mandating these grantin-aid limitations on their compensation, the student athletes argued that
this “unreasonably restrained trade through the imposition of a cap on
70
See White v. NCAA, No. CV 06-0999, 2006 WL 8066802 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2006)
(describing that White v. NCAA marked the first major antitrust push by student athletes
against the NCAA in the twenty-first century and focused on a subset of different issues
and grievances related to a discrepancy in grant-in-aid tuition money for student athletes).
71
See id.
72
See Courtney O’Brien, Change of Pace for Grants-in-Aid: Why the Former NCAA
Scholarship Bylaw Violated Antitrust and Student Athletes Should Be Able to Recover 25
(2013) (Article, Seton Hall Law) (available at https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_
scholarship/76/).
73
See Alston v. NCAA: The Reincarnation of White v. NCAA, BARLOW, GARSEK &
SIMON, LLP (Mar. 13, 2014), https://bgsfirm.com/alston-v-ncaa-the-reincarnation-ofwhite-v-ncaa/ (highlighting that since the 2008 settlement between the student-athlete
plaintiffs and the NCAA in White that resulted in student athletes receiving access to funds
for educational purposes past the money they receive for a grant-in-aid scholarship, the
Alston case represents the reincarnation of White and signifies the continuous push by
student athletes to fight for compensation for their NIL after earning a notable victory in
the White settlement).
74
See generally Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of
Just., A Stepwise Approach to Antitrust Review of Horizontal Restraints, Address Before
the American Bar Association’s Antitrust Section Semi-Annual Fall Policy Program (Nov.
7, 1996), https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/stepwise-approach-anitrust-review-horizonta
l-agreements (explaining that a “horizontal agreement” is one made among economic
competitors on the same level of production or distribution that results in price fixing in
that particular economic sphere).
75
See Thomas Baker II et al., White v. NCAA: A Chink in the Antitrust Armor, 21 J.
LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 75, 76 (2011).
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athletic-based financial aid in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act” because
the cap prevented them from covering the complete cost of their
attendance.76 The student athletes requested the court enjoin the NCAA
from enforcing its grant-in-aid policy to allow the student athletes to meet
their full cost of attendance burden, including their extra expenses not
covered by financial aid. 77 Whether the grant-in-aid limits were enough to
constitute an antitrust violation was never actually determined by the
court, as the parties ultimately settled before trial. 78 Under the settlement,
the NCAA permitted schools to purchase health insurance for student
athletes and established a $10 million fund for past athletes to receive a
cash payment or additional money to further their education. 79 This victory
for student athletes led to a broadening of future suits against the NCAA
on antitrust grounds, perhaps most notably in O’Bannon v. NCAA. 80
In O’Bannon, a group of former student athletes sued the NCAA
arguing that the NCAA and EA Sports’ use of their NIL in video games
and in media broadcasts constituted an antitrust violation under § I of the
Sherman Act. 81 Brought by Edward O’Bannon, a former All-American
76
Id.; see generally Lois Elfman, NCAA to Provide Former Student-Athletes with
Benefits, DIVERSE (Aug. 7, 2008), https://www.diverseeducation.com/sports/article/15087
519/ncaa-to-provide-former-student-athletes-with-benefits.
77
See generally Daniel E. Lazaroff, The NCAA in its Second Century: Defender of
Amateurism or Antitrust Recidivist?, 86 OR. L. REV. 329, 336 (2007) (explaining that the
NCAA’s limitations on the number of financial aid awards each school may provide to its
student athletes in addition to the NCAA’s bar on donors contributing funds to finance a
student athlete’s scholarship or grant-in-aid “operate to diminish or eliminate potential
economic competition for players in major NCAA sports such as . . . football and Division
I basketball, despite the fact that revenues from those sports may generate millions of
dollars for the institutions involved”).
78
Baker et al., supra note 75, at 77; Drew N. Goodwin, Not Quite Filling the Gap: Why
the Miscellaneous Expense Allowance Leaves the NCAA Vulnerable to Antitrust Litigation,
54 B.C. L. REV. 1277, 1300–01, 1280 (2013) (noting that despite settling before trial, White
v. NCAA “provided future litigants with a blueprint for an antitrust suit against the NCAA
that would at least survive a motion to dismiss”).
79
See Important NCAA Lawsuits, ATHNET, https://www.athleticscholarships.net/
important-ncaa-lawsuits.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2022) (laying out the terms of the
NCAA’s ultimate settlement with the group of student athlete plaintiffs in White and noting
that in addition to the schools now being able to purchase health insurance for its student
athletes, they also provided two separate funds that were combined together into one to
further benefit student athletes for purposes other than health insurance, including student
athletes receiving additional money in their academic pursuits); Thaddeus Kennedy, NCAA
and an Antitrust Exemption: The Death of College Athletes’ Rights, HARV. J. SPORTS &
ENT. L. (Aug. 31, 2020), https://harvardjsel.com/2020/08/ncaa-and-an-antitrust-exemption
-the-death-of-college-athletes-rights/.
80
See O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015) and accompanying text, supra
note 61.
81
Id. at 1055; see also Samuel Draper, The Ed O’Bannon Case: How It Has Affected
the NCAA and the Future Prospects of Paying Student-Athletes, UNIV. OF BALT. L. REV.
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basketball player and 1995 National Championship winner at the
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), and other former college
basketball and football athletes, the student-athlete plaintiffs argued that
by using college athletes’ NIL in various EA Sports video games without
their express consent or compensation, the NCAA illegally restrained
trade under § 1 of the Sherman Act. 82
The case came before Judge Claudia Wilken of the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California—who also presided
over the district-level proceedings in Alston in 2021 83—as the district court
applied the Rule of Reason analysis 84 in assessing whether the NCAA’s
compensation restraints violated § 1 of the Sherman Act. 85 For the first
step of anticompetitive effects, the district court found that the NCAA’s
compensation restraints had an anticompetitive effect on the college
education market, discerning its agreement with its member institutions to
(Mar. 24, 2017), https://ubaltlawreview.com/2017/03/24/the-ed-obannon-case-how-ithas-affected-the-ncaa-and-the-future-prospects-of-paying-student-athletes/ (citing Matt
Simenstad, The Ed O’Bannon Class Action Lawsuit–A New Paradigm for College Sports,
45 COLO. L. REV. 31, 31 (2016)) (describing that O’Bannon led the UCLA basketball team
to a 31-2 regular season record as well as a national championship in 1995, earning the
Most Outstanding Player award and the John R. Wooden Award for being the best college
basketball player in NCAA Division I). After O’Bannon ascended to the professional level,
the NCAA continued to benefit from his college play by re-broadcasting his impressive
1995 season and licensing the right to video games that encompassed features of his
Bruins’ team in their national championship run in 1995. Id.
82
See Michael Steele, O’Bannon v. NCAA: The Beginning of the End of the Amateurism
Justification for the NCAA in Antitrust Litigation, 99 MARQ. L. REV. 511, 537 (2015)
(emphasizing that when the College Football Playoff structure was born in 2011, the Power
Five Conferences still retained a large swath of power despite the NCAA’s amateurism
rules). Further, the NCAA Board of Directors in 2014 voted to allows the Power Five
Conferences or the “five richest leagues” to write some of their own rules, but this is in
direct contradiction to the NCAA’s own amateurism argument made in O’Bannon. Id. at
537- 38 (first citing Brian Bennett, NCAA Board Votes to Allow Autonomy, ESPN (Aug. 7,
2014), https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/11321551/ncaa-board-votes-allow
-autonomy-five-power-conferences; then citing O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955,
1003–04 (N.D. Cal. 2014)). Not only did the NCAA afford the Power Five Conferences
this wide autonomy, but also the vote to do so was overwhelming, which again spotlights
the shaky ground on which the NCAA has planted its amateurism flag. Id. (citing Bennett,
supra).
83
Steve Berkowitz, NCAA Takes Legal Hit Again: Judge Refuses to End Case That
Could Bring TV Money to Athletes, USA TODAY (June 24, 2021, 2:30 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2021/06/24/name-image-and-likenesslawsuit-moves-forward-ncaa-loses-again/7777027002/.
84
See generally Carrier, supra note 55, at 50-51 (laying out the four-step framework
employed by Judge Wilken at the district court level in Alston despite the NCAA’s
argument against being subjected to antitrust scrutiny).
85
See generally O’Bannon, 802 F. 3d at 1057 (explaining that the district court
conducted the Rule of Reason analysis in response to the rise of companies such as EA
Sports using student athletes NIL in video games during the social media age).
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be a price-fixing agreement as the member institutions acted as the spokes
of a hub-and-spoke cartel that colluded to fix the price of their product. 86
The district court further explained that absent the NCAA rules related
to NIL, its member institutions would be able to compete with each other
by offering high school recruits monetary compensation that exceeded the
cost of attendance, thereby “effectively lower[ing] the price that the
recruits must pay for the combination of educational and athletic
opportunities that the schools provide.” 87 Thus, the NCAA’s rules
prohibiting student athletes from receiving compensation for the use of
their NIL in the EA Sports video games result in a price-fixing
agreement. 88 The recruits “pay for the bundles of services provided by
colleges with their labor and their NILs, but the ‘sellers’ of these
bundles—the colleges—collectively ‘agree to value [NILs] at zero.’” 89 In
doing so, the member institutions of the NCAA are acting as a cohort of
sellers colluding to fix the price of their product—student athletes’ NIL—
and behaving like a cartel. 90
For the second step of procompetitive purposes, the NCAA put forth
four arguments to justify its compensation restraints: (1) protecting the
“amateur” tradition and identity of college sports; (2) promoting a
competitive balance in FBS 91 football and Division I basketball; (3)
linking academics with athletics; and (4) increasing the output of the
college education market. 92 The district court partially accepted the first
See id. at 1057–58; Marc Edelman, The District Court Decision in O’Bannon v.
National Collegiate Athletic Association: A Small Step Forward for College-Athlete
Rights, and a Gateway for Far Grander Change, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2319, 2331-32
(2014).
87
See generally O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d 972 (touching on the benefit specifically to
high school recruits from lower-income backgrounds as the financial considerations of
attending a university and participating in collegiate athletics are a large contributory factor
in the university in which they choose to commit).
88
See id. at 973 (proposing the notion that the colleges and universities recruiting
student athletes unanimously agreed to fix the price of student athletes NIL at zero to
benefit from their on-field performance while restricting them from profiting off their own
NIL).
89
O’Bannon, 802 F. 3d at 1058 (quoting O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. at 973 (N.D. Cal. 2014)).
90
See id.; Matthew N. Korenoski, O’Bannon v. NCAA: An Antitrust Assault on the
NCAA’s Dying Amateurism Principle, 54 DUQ. L. REV. 493, 515 (2016).
91
See generally Patrick Pinak, College Football Trivia: What Does ‘FBS’ and ‘FCS’
Actually Mean?, FANBUZZ, https://fanbuzz.com/college-football/what-does-fbs-stand-for/
(July 29, 2022) (explaining that the NCAA’s Division I football is divided into two
categories: the Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) and Football Championship Subdivision
(FCS) and that the FBS derives its name for the numerous bowl games that its teams
participate in at the close of each college football season that generate hundreds of millions
of dollars).
92
O’Bannon, 802 F. 3d at 1058 (illustrating that each of these four procompetitive
purposes brought by the NCAA were reminiscent of the procompetitive arguments that it
86
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and third justifications while rejecting the second and fourth. 93 The Court
carried both procompetitive arguments into the third step of the Rule of
Reason, where it considered whether the NCAA possessed a “substantially
less restrictive alternative to a total ban on student-athlete
compensation.” 94 The district court answered in the affirmative, finding
the NCAA possessed two legitimate, less restrictive alternatives: (1)
allowing schools to award student-athlete stipends up to the full cost of the
school’s attendance, which compensated them for deficiencies in their
grants-in-aid; and (2) permitting schools to set aside a part of their
licensing revenues in trusts that would be distributed to student athletes in
equal shares after they leave their college or university. 95
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the court largely agreed with the
district court on its analysis of the anticompetitive and procompetitive
Rule of Reason factors, finding: (1) a cognizable “college education
market” exists as colleges compete for athletic recruits by offering
scholarships and other amenities, (2) absent the NCAA’s compensation
rules, universities would compete to offer recruits compensation, and (3)
the NCAA’s compensation rules have a significant anticompetitive effect
on the college education market by fixing the price that recruits pay to
attend college. 96 The Ninth Circuit further held that the district court
brought in the landmark Board of Regents case with particular emphasis on its
“amateurism” argument).
93
See id. (explaining that the first procompetitive justification of the NCAA protecting
the “amateur” tradition and identity of collegiate athletics was at the center of the district
court’s analysis as it remained a recurring argument for the NCAA since the Court’s Board
of Regents decision in 1984).
94
See id. at 1058, 1060 (quoting O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1004–05); see also Marc
Edelman, A Prelude to Jenkins v. NCAA: Amateurism, Antitrust Law, and the Role of
Consumer Demand in a Proper Rule of Reason Analysis, 78 LA. L. REV. 227, 236 (2018)
(explaining that the district court enjoined the NCAA from enforcing any rules that “would
prohibit its member schools and conferences from offering their FBS football and Division
I [men’s] basketball recruits a limited share of the revenues generated from the use of their
names, images, and likenesses, in addition to a full grant-in-aid,” marking the first ruling
of this kind in sports-antitrust jurisprudence). But Judge Wilken’s order only forbade the
NCAA from restricting payments to student athletes that exceeded their full cost of
attendance at their respective college or university plus a deferred compensation of $5,000
per year, which fell well short of establishing an absolutely free market for student athlete
services. See id.
95
O’Bannon, 802 F. 3d at 1060–61. Both of these less restrictive alternatives would
particularly benefit student athletes from lower income backgrounds seeking to attend
schools with above average tuition costs in affluent geographical locations who may not
be able to attend the school without stipends to supplement grant-in-aid money. See id.
96
See id. at 1070; see also Stephen F. Ross & Wayne S. DeSarbo, A Rapid Reaction to
O’Bannon: The Need for Analytics in Applying the Sherman Act to Overly Restrictive Joint
Venture Schemes, 119 PENN ST. L. REV. PEN STATIM. 43, 46 (2014) (noting that under the
Court’s application of the Rule of Reason analysis and finding that O’Bannon had
successfully shown anticompetitive effects in the relevant economic market, the court
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clearly erred in analyzing the third Rule of Reason factor because “an
alternative must be ‘virtually as effective’ in serving the procompetitive
purposes of the NCAA’s current rules, and ‘without significantly
increased cost’” but that “allowing students to be paid compensation for
their NILs is virtually as effective as the NCAA’s current amateur-status
rule.” 97 Although the Supreme Court later denied a certiorari petition to
hear this case in October 2016, the O’Bannon decision still marked an
important victory for student athletes: the Ninth Circuit recognized and
defined the student athletes’ cognizable labor market, which the NCAA
had vehemently opposed as a lynchpin of its argument for the necessity of
its compensation restraints. 98

B. State Legislatures Passing Fair Pay to Play Legislation to Pave
a Path for the Supreme Court’s Decision in Alston
Two years prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Alston, student
athletes gained a notable NIL victory as the California Legislature passed
Senate Bill 206 (SB 206)—later named the “Fair Pay to Play Act”—in late
2019, which prohibited California colleges and universities from revoking
a student athlete’s scholarship or eligibility for receiving money for their
NIL. 99 SB 206 passed the California Legislature with overwhelming

credited persuasive testimony from Roger G. Noll, a leading sports economist, as he
testified that “those student-athletes seeking to play football after high school found no
reasonable substitute for college football programs participating in the Football Bowl
Subdivision (FBS), and those seeking to pursue a post-secondary basketball career found
no reasonable substitute for Division I college basketball”).
97
O’Bannon, 802 F. 3d at 1074 (quoting Cnty. of Tuolumne v. Sonora Cmty. Hosp.,
236 F.3d 1148, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001)).
98
See generally Still No NCAA Pay for Play—Supreme Court Denies Cert. in O’Bannon
v. NCAA, OGLETREE DEAKINS (Oct. 3, 2016), https://ogletree.com/insights/still-no-ncaapay-for-play-supreme-court-denies-cert-in-obannon-v-ncaa/ (noting specifically that the
Ninth Circuit panel, after rejecting many of the NCAA’s arguments, focused on the third
step of the Rule of Reason analysis for whether there were substantially less restrictive
alternatives to the NCAA’s rules that were “virtually as effective . . . without significant
increased cost”). While Judge Wilken in the district court proceedings found that paying
student athletes compensation promoted amateurism as effectively as not paying them in
the first place, the Ninth Circuit noted that this decision was made in clear error because
the district court ignored the basic principle that paying refraining from paying student
athletes for their athletic performance is precisely what provides them the “amateur” status.
See id.
99
See West, supra note 28 and accompanying text; see also Governor Newsom Signs
SB 206, Taking on Long-Standing Power Imbalance in College Sports, CA.GOV (Sept. 30,
2019), https://www.gov.ca.gov/2019/09/30/governor-newsom-signs-sb-206-taking-onlong-standing-power-imbalance-in-college-sports/ (explaining that Governor Newson
singed SB 206 alongside notable co-sponsors of the bill including Los Angeles Lakers
small forward LeBron James, Senator Nancy Skinner of California, UCLA gymnast

2022]

THE DEMISE OF THE HUB-AND-SPOKE CARTEL

59

bipartisan support—despite strong opposition from the University of
Southern California (USC), Stanford University, the University of
California system, and California State University schools for fear of
NCAA retribution 100—making California the first state in the nation to
recognize official support for allowing student athletes to profit off their
NIL. 101 Taking effect on January 1, 2021, SB 206 allows all student
athletes enrolled in both public and private four-year universities in
California to earn money from their NIL. 102 Further, SB 206 restricts
California colleges and universities from enforcing NCAA rules that
prevent student athletes from earning compensation and will prevent the
NCAA from banning California universities from intercollegiate sports
should their athletes decide to sign sponsorship deals.” 103 Washington was
the only other state in 2019 to attempt to follow in California’s footsteps
with HB 1084, but it was ultimately rejected out of uncertainty
surrounding whether other states would join California and stand up to the
NCAA on the NIL front. 104
In 2020, ten states attempted to pass similar Fair Pay to Play
legislation as the topic of student-athlete compensation began to draw
Katelyn Ohashi, former UCLA national champion power forward Edward O’Bannon,
Phoenix Mercury guard Diana Taurasi, and founder of Klutch Sports Group Rich Paul).
100
See J. Brady McCollough, News Analysis: What’s Next for NCAA and College Athletics
Now That SB 206 is Law?, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2019, 5:40 PM), https://www.latimes.com/
sports/story/2019-09-30/what-next-for-ncaa-college-athletics-now-that-sb-206-is-law
(noting that the final vote for SB 206 was a unanimous 73-0 in favor of passing the bill).
101
See Governor Newsom Signs SB 206, Taking on Long-Standing Power Imbalance in
College Sports, supra note 99 (illustrating that California’s choice to pass SB 206 despite
opposition from prominent universities and school systems within the state served as an
example for other states contemplating Fair Pay to Play legislation in their respective
legislatures).
102
See generally William B. Gould IV, American Amateur Players Arise: You Have
Nothing to Lose but Your Amateurism, 61 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 159, 160 (2020) (noting
that with the high cost of tuition in many California schools and universities both inside
and outside of the UC and Cal State systems, SB 206 provided a significant monetary
incentive for recruits to attend a California college or university as SB 206 spearheaded the
legislative push for student athletes’ NIL rights).
103
See generally Neal Newman, Let’s Get Serious – The Clear Case for Compensating
the Student Athlete – By the Numbers, 51 N.M. L. REV. 37, 66–68 (2021) (discussing
California’s unique position of leverage as one of the main state markets that is integral to
the NCAA’s continued viability, allowing California to stave off the NCAA’s threats and
become the pioneer in Fair Pay to Play legislation).
104
See generally Andrew Smalley, Student Athlete Compensation Legislation, NAT’L
CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (July 2, 2021), https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=eyJrIjoiZ
TM5OTI1YmEtZWVkZC00M2ZhLTlmZWYtMTdlYzIwNmYxZjA3IiwidCI6IjM4Mm
ZiOGIwLTRkYzMtNDEwNy04MGJkLTM1OTViMjQzMmZhZSIsImMiOjZ9&pageNa
me=ReportSection (providing a map of student-athlete compensation legislation across the
United States with a table noting each state’s Fair Pay to Play legislation and the stage of
the legislative process for each state’s bill).
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increasing media popularity, with Colorado, Florida, Michigan, New
Jersey, and Nebraska all becoming successful in passing such
legislation. 105 In 2021, as the Supreme Court’s ruling in Alston drew near,
the NIL issue exploded in state legislatures, with seventeen states passing
Fair Pay to Play Acts and two states passing executive orders—bringing
the total number of states to pass such legislation up to twenty-seven—and
eleven states pending approval on their Fair Pay to Play proposals. 106 With
the recent surge of state legislatures passing Fair Pay to Play Acts in 2021,
94% of all NCAA member institutions now reside in a state that has either
enacted or introduced a Fair Pay to Play Act or an equivalent piece of
legislation. 107 As a possible motivation for this rapid increase and
proliferation of state legislation, some states cited their “need to remain
relevant for recruiting” as a strong contributing factor in their decision to
pass Fair Pay to Play legislation in 2021. 108 Nine states have yet to
introduce any Fair Pay to Play legislation, but only four Power Five
schools 109 reside in these states, “with their total NCAA membership
impact accounting for roughly 6%.” 110
In addition to state legislatures acting quickly in the wake of Alston,
bipartisan members at the federal level engaged in their own separate
effort to address the student-athlete compensation issue, proposing several
See id. (illustrating that within each of these states, there is a school that is a member
of a major athletic conference, which likely served as a contributing factor in these specific
states following California’s lead with their own Fair Pay to Play legislation).
106
See Andrew Smalley, Student Athlete Compensation, NAT’L CONF. STATE
LEGISLATURE (Mar. 16, 2022), https://www.ncsl.org/research/education/student-athletecompensation.aspx (noting that Fair Pay to Play Acts in fourteen states—Alabama,
Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico,
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Texas—took effect on July 1, 2021 to be
followed by a handful of other states in 2022).
107
Braly Keller, NIL Incoming: Comparing State Laws and Proposed Legislation,
OPENDORSE (July 16, 2021), https://opendorse.com/blog/comparing-state-nil-lawsproposed-legislation/.
108
Smalley, supra note 106 (emphasizing the logical prospect that a high school recruit
is more likely to be drawn to a school in a state where he or she can profit off their NIL
rather than a state without Fair Pay to Play legislation).
109
See generally, Power Five Conferences, WIKIPEDIA (Sept. 25, 2022), https://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Power_Five_conferences (defining “Power Five conferences” as the
“five athletic conferences which are considered elite in college football” —one of which
generally harbors the winner of the College Football Playoff in January—including the
Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC), the BIG 12 Conference (BIG 12), the BIG Ten
Conference (BIG 10), the Pacific 12 Conference (PAC-12), and the Southeastern
Conference (SEC)).
110
See Keller, supra note 107 (highlighting the correlation between states with a
multitude of colleges and universities in major competitive athletic conferences passing
Fair Pay to Play legislation much quicker than states with fewer competitive schools in
major athletic conferences).
105
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bills in Congress which built upon the work of the states. 111 Notably in
April 2021, U.S. Representatives Emanuel Cleaver II, a Missouri
Democrat, and Anthony Gonzalez, an Ohio Republican, reintroduced the
Student Athlete Level Playing Field Act, which seeks to “establish a
federal standard for student-athlete compensation, create congressional
oversight, and amend federal law to protect the recruiting process.” 112
Earlier, in February 2021, U.S. Representatives Lori Trahan, a
Massachusetts Democrat, and Chris Murphy, a Connecticut Democrat,
introduced the College Athlete Economic Freedom Act in an attempt to
“codify the right of college athletes to market the use of their names,
images, likenesses and athletic reputations across the country” and permit
student athletes using “collective representation and retain legal
representation to fully exercise these rights.” 113
A former Division I student athlete, Congresswoman Trahan, noted
that she’s “all too familiar with the NCAA’s business model that for
decades has utilized the guise of amateurism to justify obscene
profitability while student athletes have struggled to get by,” and that it is
vital “Congress enact reforms to establish and protect student athletes’
right to be compensated for the use of their name, image, likeness, or
athletic association.” 114 Senator Murphy added that “[b]ig time college
111
See Andrew Smalley, Student-Athlete “Pay for Play” Gets Lawmakers’ Attention,
NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (May 24, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/
education/student-athlete-pay-to-play-gets-lawmakers-attention-magazine2021.aspx
(explaining that the specific provisions of Fair Pay to Play legislation vary by state although
each state generally includes some form of language that prevents the NCAA, conferences,
and schools from barring student athletes from obtaining compensation from their NIL).
Further, many states in their Fair Pay to Play legislation “also allow [student] athletes to
hire agents and require advertising and endorsement deals to be reported to schools” while
other states have created unique provisions and payment structures regarding studentathlete compensation for NIL rights. Smalley, supra note 106.
112
Smalley, supra note 106; see also Reps. Cleaver, Gonzalez Unveil Bipartisan Bill to
Grant NIL Rights to College Athletes, CONGRESSIONAL EMANUEL CLEAVER (Sept. 24,
2020), https://cleaver.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/reps-cleaver-gonzalez-unveil
-bipartisan-bill-to-grant-name-image-and (noting that Representative Cleaver II and
Representative Anthony Gonzalez, who were both former collegiate athletes, were joined
by Representative Colin Allred, a Democrat from Texas; Rodney Davis, a Republic from
Illinois; Josh Gottheimer, a Democrat from New Jersey; Jeff Duncan, a Republican from
South Carolina; Marcia Fudge, a Democrat from Ohio; and Steve Stivers, a Republican
from Ohio).
113
Smalley, supra note 111; see also The “College Athlete Economic Freedom Act” is a
Step Forward, THE DRAKE GROUP, https://www.thedrakegroup.org/2021/02/11/thecollege-athlete-freedom-act-is-a-step-forward/ (finding that the College Athlete Economic
Freedom Act “goes well beyond existing proposed legislation at the federal and state
level,” and “there are no guardrails to constrain [student] athlete NIL income” pertaining
to compensation rights for student athletes).
114
Trahan, Murphy Introduce Legislation to Allow College Athletes to Make Money Off
Their Name, Image and Likeness, UNITED STATES CONGRESSWOMAN LORI TRAHAN (Feb.

62

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:1

athletics look no different than professional leagues, and it’s time for us to
stop denying the right of college athletes to make money off their
talents . . . this is about restoring athletes’ ownership over the use of their
own names and likeness.” 115
And finally, Senator Jerry Moran, a Republican from Kansas,
introduced the Amateur Athletes Protection and Compensation Act of
2021 in an effort to prohibit the NCAA and its member institutions from
making a student athlete ineligible if the student athlete is receiving
monetary compensation. 116 This legislation, which is still being considered
in Congress, set a floor in furthering the purpose of antitrust law in the
student athletes’ long and hard-fought battle against the NCAA: Congress
will “protect competition, not the competitors,” and the NCAA’s
conferences are better decision-makers than the NCAA to enforce relevant
compensation restraints because directly compete with each other.117
With both state and federal legislation trending toward following
California’s lead with its 2019 Fair Pay to Play Act, the national landscape
became a competitive battlefield in which the states who have passed Fair
Pay to Play legislation have given the colleges and universities in their
4, 2021), https://trahan.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=1967 (stating
that among other benefits, the College Athlete Economic Freedom Act will “[e]stablish a
federal right for college athletes to market the use of their name, image, likeness, or athletic
reputation . . . by prohibiting colleges, conferences, and the NCAA from setting or
enforcing rules that restrict this right or otherwise colluding to limit how athletes can use
their NIL, including by setting rules restricting this right for prospective college athletes”).
115
Id.; see also Andrew Zimbalist, The College Athlete Economic Freedom Act Proposed
in Congress is a Step Forward on NIL Rights, UNITED STATES CONGRESSWOMAN LORI
TRAHAN (Feb. 7, 2021), https://trahan.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID
=1983 (noting that the College Athlete Economic Freedom Act goes well beyond other
bills of its kind at the state and federal level and will likely open up long needed discussion
on the necessary scope of an equitable system for college athletes).
116
See Sen. Moran Introduces Bill to Establish a Federal Standard for Student Athletes
to Receive Compensation for Their Name, Image and Likeness, UNITED STATES SENATOR
FOR KANSAS JERRY MORAN (Feb. 24, 2021), https://www.moran.senate.gov/public/index.
cfm/2021/2/sen-moran-introduces-bill-to-establish-a-federal-standard-for-studentathletes-to-receive-compensation-for-their-name-image-and-likeness (explaining the
benefits of the Act including, but not limited to, allowing student athletes to transfer
schools at least once without being penalized, establishing one set of rules to govern all
college athletics, and protecting student athletes’ status as a student by not considering
them as employees of their institutions).
117
See generally William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. for Int’l Enf’t,
Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just, What is Competition?, Address Before the Seminar on
Convergence (Oct. 28, 2002), https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/what-competition
(reflecting the views of William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for
International Enforcement of the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, as
he explains that the conferences comprised of NCAA member institutions are better suited
to govern the labor market of student athletes and avoid the antitrust pitfalls that the NCAA
has fallen into).
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states a distinct recruiting advantage, while the states who have held out
are potentially losing key athletic recruits. 118 The opportunity for a high
school recruit to earn income from their NIL that surpasses that of the
traditional grant-in aid tuition cap—for example, possibly from a local
restaurant chain or sporting goods store in the state—may likely steer that
recruit toward a state with Fair Pay to Play legislation. 119 While there is
little empirical evidence thus far of recruiting advantages or disadvantages
based on NIL at the college or high school level, the possibility of such a
recruiting advantage in the future inherently provides states with multiple
NCAA schools within their borders ample incentive to follow their
counterparts that have already passed such legislation, while states such as
Wyoming, with only one Division I university in their entire state, may
not feel such pressure. 120 Seemingly, a nationwide NIL policy applicable
to all student athletes regardless of the state in which they choose to attend
college, would solve the discrepancies and recruiting advantages and
disadvantages between the states, but the NCAA appears “willing to
abdicate this responsibility to Congress should lawmakers be willing to
take it on.” 121

See Justin Casey, The Landscape for College Athletes’ Commercial Rights is
Changing, SPORTBUSINESS (Nov. 23, 2020), https://www.sportbusiness.com/2020/11/
justin-casey-the-landscape-for-college-athletes-commercial-rights-is-changing/
(illustrating the effect of New Jersey Governor Phil Murphy signing the New Jersey Fair
Pay to Play Act into law by stating that a football player at a university in a state without
NIL legislation would “have his earning potential capped at the amount of grant-in-aid he
receives from the University, whereas at Rutgers [University] that same player might
receive both grant-in-aid and additional income in the form of a fair market value
endorsement deal with a local restaurant chain” in New Jersey).
119
See id. (highlighting a distinct recruiting advantage for schools that are able to offer
students NIL rights based on their state’s legislation and based on the plethora of local and
chain establishments waiting to sign endorsement deals with the school’s student athletes).
120
See generally List of NCAA Division I Schools, 1KEYDATA https://state.1keydata.com
/ncaa-division-1-schools-by-state.php (last visited Oct. 10, 2022) (breaking down the
amount of Division I schools in each state as a visual representation of which states are
likely to be more affected in their NCAA recruiting efforts with or without the presence of
Fair Pay to Play legislation passed in their respective state and listing Wyoming as tied for
the lowest amount of Division I schools in its state with one school, the University of
Wyoming, which competes in the Mountain West Conference (MWC)).
121
Casey, supra note 118 (noting that since the NCAA has ceded the prospect of a
nationwide NIL policy to Congress, there has been a greater focus on individual states’
Fair Pay to Play legislation in the meantime while Congress contemplates such a policy).
118
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II. THE COURT’S REJECTION OF THE NCAA’S AMATEURISM AND
VIEWERSHIP PROCOMPETITIVE ARGUMENTS THROUGH THE RULE OF
REASON ANALYSIS
A. District Court Proceedings in Alston: Judge Wilken Summarily
Rejected the NCAA’s Plea for Antitrust Immunity and
Procompetitive Justification Under the Rule of Reason Analysis
A notably substantial portion of the Alston majority opinion authored
by Justice Gorsuch is dedicated to analyzing whether the district court
erred in subjecting the NCAA’s compensation restraints to the Rule of
Reason analysis and if the district court’s factual findings at each step of
the analysis were sound. 122 Delving into Shawne Alston and Justine
Hartman’s fellow male and female student-athlete plaintiffs’ antitrust
challenge alleging the NCAA and its member institutions violated § 1 of
the Sherman Act by restricting compensation for student athletes, U.S.
District Judge Claudia Wilken “refused to disturb the NCAA’s rules
limiting undergraduate athletic scholarships and other compensation
related to athletic performance.” 123 But in her holding, Judge Wilken did
strike down the NCAA’s rules limiting the education-related benefits
available to student athletes at their respective colleges and universities,
which included prohibiting colleges and universities from offering
graduate or vocational school scholarships to student athletes. 124 In
response, the NCAA contended that the district court should have
approved its restraints in their entirety, in essence seeking “immunity from
the normal operation of the antitrust laws.” 125

See NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2155-57 (2021) (explaining that because
Justice Gorsuch and the Supreme Court largely agreed with the application of the Rule of
Reason as well as the district court’s factual findings, the majority of the Court’s opinion
in Alston recounted and broke down the district court’s opinion).
123
Id., at 2147; see also Kord Wilkerson, NCAA v. Alston: Tackling College Athlete
Compensation, MISS. COLL. L. REV.: BLOG (Sept. 3, 2021), https://mclawreview.org/2021/
09/03/ncaa-v-alston-tackling-college-athlete-compensation/ (explaining that the student
athlete plaintiffs felt that the district court did not go far enough and that the court’s
injunction should have extended past simply educational benefits to the NCAA’s
compensation limits in all other areas while the NCAA felt that the district court went too
far by weakening its compensation limits and educational limitations with the injunction).
124
Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2153 (noting that Judge Wilken’s ruling included affording
collegiate athletes $5,000 per year in deferred compensation for their NIL).
125
Id. at 2147. See generally William F. Murphy II, Antitrust Law-ImmunityAnticompetitive Activities Required of State-Regulated Public Utility Not Immune from
Antitrust Attack, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 628, 640 (1977) (explaining that certain statesanctioned anticompetitive activities that are considered “comparably imperative” or are
deemed “crucial” to the integrity and “operation of an otherwise valid regulatory scheme
122
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The district court applied the Rule of Reason analysis to assess the
NCAA’s compensation restraints despite the NCAA’s vigorous objections
that it should be held to “an abbreviated deferential review” 126 in lieu of
antitrust scrutiny. 127 The NCAA chose not to contest evidence at the
district court level illustrating that the organization and its members
“agreed to compensation limits on student-athletes; the NCAA and its
conferences enforce these limits by punishing violations; and these limits
‘affect interstate commerce.’” 128 The NCAA further acknowledged the
Court already reviewed and ultimately struck down a handful of its
restraints as being anticompetitive in the 1984 Board of Regents
decision. 129 The NCAA similarly recognized that the Court previously
observed the Sherman Act’s application to multiple other nonprofit
organizations and “‘the economic significance of the NCAA’s nonprofit
character is questionable at best’ given that ‘the NCAA and its member
institutions are in fact organized to maximize revenues.’” 130
However, the NCAA did not concede without a vigorous fight,
vehemently arguing it should be exempted from the Rule of Reason
analysis because of its classification as a joint venture 131. 132 Rejecting this
remain immune from attack, while the ancillary activities of a regulated firm are granted
no immunity”).
126
Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2155; see also Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 7 n.3 (2006)
(explaining that circumstances in antitrust litigation sometimes allow a court to forgo a full
Rule of Reason analysis in favor of determining the anticompetitive effects of a challenged
restraint under an abbreviated or “quick look” analysis to assess potential Sherman Act
violations).
127
Brief for Petitioner at 14, Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (No. 20-512).
128
Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2151 (citing In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust
Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1066 (N.D. Cal. 2019)).
129
Id., at 2159 (marking one of many times that the Court took a firm stance against the
NCAA attempting to revive its old arguments from past antitrust litigation in the twentieth
and twenty-first centuries).
130
See Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2159 (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla.,
468 U.S. 85, 100–101 n. 22 (1984)).
131
See generally Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Beyond Per Se, Rule of Reason or Merger
Analysis: A New Antitrust Standard for Joint Ventures, MINN. L. REV. 1, 20 (1991)
(explaining that there is a long history of joint ventures being exempted from antitrust
scrutiny under the Rule of Reason analysis, including the Export Trading Company Act of
1982, which grant firms an exemption from antitrust liability if their joint export activities
do not adversely affect competition within the United States).
132
See Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2155. But see Jack Marshall, Law vs. Ethics #2: The Supreme
Court Unanimously Says Colleges Can Use Tuition to Run a Professional Sports Business,
ETHICS ALARMS (June 22, 2021), https://ethicsalarms.com/2021/06/22/law-vs-ethics-2the-supreme-court-unanimously-says-colleges-can-use-tuition-to-run-a-professionalsports-business/ (opining that from an ethical perspective, the Court’s decision to subject
the NCAA to antitrust scrutiny and eventually grant student athletes education-related
benefits will result in non-athlete students revolting against their universities for bearing
the “uniformly inflated tuition” while student athletes profit off of their NIL).
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argument, Judge Wilken found that “the NCAA’s status as a particular
type of venture [does not] categorically exempt its restraints from ordinary
rule of reason review.” 133 Still, the NCAA resisted the Rule of Reason
application, arguing as a last ditch effort that the analysis was
inappropriate because the organization and its member institutions are not
“‘commercial enterprises’ and instead oversee intercollegiate athletics ‘as
an integral part of the undergraduate experience.’” 134 One by one, Judge
Wilken struck down each of the NCAA’s arguments and despite the
NCAA’s fervor in attempting to avoid antitrust scrutiny, decided to apply
the Rule of Reason analysis in this case. 135
In justifying its application of the Rule of Reason analysis to Alston,
the district court harkened back to the pivotal 2010 Supreme Court
decision in American Needle v. National Football League, where the Court
found that while “some restraints are necessary to create or maintain a
league sport, [it] does not mean all ‘aspects of elaborate interleague
cooperation are.’” 136 Building upon American Needle’s jurisprudence, the
district court in Alston found holistically that the NCAA and its multitude
of member colleges and universities essentially possessed the “power to
restrain student-athlete compensation in any way and at any time they
wish, without any meaningful risk of diminishing their market
dominance.” 137
For the first step of its Rule of Reason analysis, the district court
highlighted that the NCAA’s compensation restrictions on student athletes
See Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2156; see Gregg E. Clifton, NCAA v. Alston – The Wait is
Over . . . What’s Next for the NCAA, NAT’L L. REV. (Jun. 22, 2021), https://www.
natlawreview.com/article/ncaa-v-alston-wait-overwhat-s-next-ncaa (noting that Judge
Wilken, despite agreeing in large part with the student-athlete plaintiff, “rejected th[eir]
extreme position . . . when she ruled and the Ninth Circuit affirmed that while the NCAA
can lawfully restrict athletics-related expenses, the NCAA violates the law by restricting
expenses that are ‘tethered’ to academics”).
134
Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2158 (quoting Brief for Petitioner, supra note 127, at 31).
135
See id. at 2151; see also Sandeep Vaheesan, Challenging the NCAA Cartel: When
Consumer Welfare Equals Worker Exploitation, HARV. L. REV.: BLOG (June 9, 2020),
https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/challenging-the-ncaa-cartel-when-consumer-welfareequals-worker-exploitation/ (adding that on top of Judge Wilken’s biting district court
opinion, Judge Milan Smith, Jr. wrote a powerful concurrence at the Ninth Circuit stating
that “the court, in its antitrust analysis, made a serious error in weighing the real harms to
the players from the NCAA’s restraints against their purported benefits to fans”).
136
Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2156 (citing Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 199 n.7
(2010)).
137
Id. at 2152 (quoting In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F.
Supp. 3d 1058, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2019)). See generally Colin P. Ahler & Mary Colleen
Fowler, U.S. Supreme Court Unanimously Rules Against NCAA in Antitrust Case,
Providing Valuable Insights on the Rule of Reason Standard, SNELL & WILMER (June 22,
2021), https://www.swlaw.com/publications/legal-alerts/2975.
133
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“produce significant anticompetitive effects in the relevant market” 138
because student athletes are prohibited from accruing more than the fullcost of their school’s tuition with a grant-in-aid scholarship. 139 Further, in
a market absent challenged restraints, “competition among schools would
increase in terms of the compensation they would offer to recruits,”
resulting in student athletes being compensated nearer to their athletic
service value. 140 Neither party disputed these findings, and the NCAA
specifically acknowledges that its “no-pay-for-play rule” establishes a
significant restraint on the cognizable student athlete antitrust labor market
as well as the monopsony power that its over 1,100 member institutions
enjoy over that labor market. 141 In other words, the Alston litigation
involves the NCAA “admitt[ing] [to] horizontal price fixing in a market
where [it] exercise[s] monopoly control.” 142
Moving to the second part of the Rule of Reason analysis, the NCAA
argued the district court erred in finding its procompetitive amateurism
argument and desire to preserve the unique nature of its “amateur” product
as an insufficient justification for its restraints on student-athlete

Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2152 (quoting In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust
Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1067). See generally Suresh Naidu et al., Antitrust Remedies for
Labor Market Power, 132 HARV. L. REV. 537, 569–70 (2018) (explaining that antitrust
litigation based on anticompetitive behavior by employers in labor markets has historically
been infrequent, but sports leagues and organizations are a common setting for such issues
to arise).
139
See Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2153; Michael S. McLeran, Playing for Peanuts:
Determining Fair Compensation for NCAA Student-Athletes, 65 DRAKE. L. REV. 255, 274
(2017) (citing Michael T. Jones, Comment, Real Accountability: The NCAA Can No
Longer Evade Antitrust Liability Through Amateurism After O’Bannon v. NCAA, 56 B.C.
L. REV. E. SUPP. 79, 81 (2015)).
140
Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 215 (quoting In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust
Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1068); Herbert J. Hovenkamp, The NCAA and the Rule of Reason,
FAC. SCHOLARSHIP AT U. PENN. L. REV. 5–7 (2017).
141
See Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2152 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, Alston 141
S. Ct. 2141 (No. 20–512)); Greg Andrews, After NCAA Legal Setbacks, ‘Pay to Play’ No
Longer Far-Fetched, LAW.COM (Nov. 12, 2021, 4:24 PM), https://www.law.com/
corpcounsel/2021/11/12/after-ncaa-legal-setbacks-pay-to-play-no-longer-far-fetched/.
142
Ilya Somin, NCAA Gets Blown Out in Major Supreme Court Antitrust Decision,
REASON (June 21, 2021, 2:36 PM), https://reason.com/volokh/2021/06/21/ncaa-gets-blown
-out-in-major-supreme-court-antitrust-decision/ (quoting Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2154)
(explaining that the Alston decision “dealt the NCAA cartel a serious blow” that may prove
to be fatal in time but that even if NCAA restrictions on paying student athletes were
abolished completely in the future, many college sports such as lacrosse, wrestling, and
rugby would likely see few to no changes since they produce a low level of revenue and
publicity for the vast majority of NCAA schools compared to powerhouse revenue-earning
sports such as Division I football and basketball).
138
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compensation. 143 The NCAA proffered that what makes collegiate sports
unique and desirable is the “amateur” element of young student athletes
competing with each other, which starkly differentiates them from grown
men and women competing with each other in the professional sports
world. 144 At the foundation of the NCAA’s amateurism procompetitive
justification, the district court noted two significant points: the NCAA’s
understanding of amateurism has itself evolved over time, and nowhere
does the NCAA explicitly define the nature of amateurism that it argues
so vehemently for. 145 Other organizations and institutions that use the term
“amateur” in their modeled infrastructure, such as the International
Olympic Committee (IOC), offer a clearer definition 146 and understanding
of the capabilities and responsibilities of “amateurs” within their unique
models. 147
With no clear definition or traceable original understanding of
amateurism to justify the procompetitive argument, the district court
turned to the NCAA’s viewership argument that its compensation
See Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2152; Mitchell Pollard, Amateurism and the NCAA: The
Controversy (A Legal Review), 16-17 (Apr. 2017) (undergraduate thesis, University of
Dayton) (on file with University of Dayton eCommons).
144
See Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2152; Alexander Knuth, Lane Violation: Why the NCAA’s
Amateurism Rules Have Overstepped Antitrust Protection & How to Correct, 95 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. REFLECTION 74, 78, 85– 86 (2019).
145
Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2152. See generally Robert Litan, The NCAA’s “Amateurism”
Rules: What’s in a Name?, MILKEN INST. REV. (Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.milkenreview.
org/articles/the-ncaas-amateurism-rules (explaining that “[u]nder the NCAA’s convoluted
rules, college athletes on scholarship are ‘amateurs’ only when playing the sports for which
they were recruited . . . .mean[ing] a college football player can still be an ‘amateur’ while
being compensated for playing another sport as a pro”).
146
See INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., ELIGIBILITY RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC
COMMITTEE, art. 26 (1964), https://stillmed.olympic.org/Documents/Olympic%20Charter/
Olympic_Charter_through_time/1964-Olympic_Charter_Eligibility_Rules_of_the_IOC.
pdf (explaining that the IOC’s definition of “amateur” which was codified in Article 26 of
the 1964 Eligibility Rules of the International Olympic Committee and remains intact today
is “one who participates and always has participated in sports as an avocation without
material gain of any kind”).
147
See Bill Connelly, As Commissioner, I Will . . . 2. Enable Players to Use the Olympic
Model of Amateurism., SB NATION, https://www.sbnation.com/a/college-footballcommissioner/olympic-model (last visited Oct. 10, 2022) (noting that the IOC, under its
international definition of the term “amateur,” allows its athletes to have access to the
commercial free market; secure endorsement deals; and profit monetarily from their NIL).
The article raises a very intriguing point in highlighting that University of Michigan Head
Coach Jim Harbaugh garners a substantial amount from company endorsement deals on
top of his $7 million salary, yet players are not paid at all. See id. Before answering this
question, the article proposes an interesting hypothetical situation. See id. If a studentathlete appears in a State Farm advertisement on television, “is he or she [able] to wear an
official school uniform?” Id. Would the school be eligible for a cut of the profits and how
might this money be disseminated? Id.
143
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restrictions directly correlate to consumer demand in individuals watching
collegiate sports in person and on television. 148 The viewership argument
in and of itself raises questions about the NCAA’s motivations, as its goal
as an institution is not to put eyeballs on the screen or bodies in the seats
at games but rather to “integrate intercollegiate athletics into higher
education” to enhance the educational experience of the student athlete. 149
But in taking the argument at face value, it proved wholly incorrect
throughout the beginning of the 2021 college football season, the first full
major Division I sports season since the Supreme Court released its
decision in Alston. 150 At the start of the 2022 college football season,
overall viewership—especially in large regular season rivalry games such
as Ohio State University v. University of Michigan—saw a notable
increase in viewership from previous seasons. 151
For the third part of the Rule of Reason analysis, student athletes have
no “viable substitutes” to the NCAA 152 and its rules if they seek to play
professionally unless they choose to forgo their collegiate career and enter

See Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2152–53 (noting the apparent discrepancy that the NCAA, a
nonprofit organization, appeared more concerned with how many individuals it could get
to watch and attend its member universities’ games rather than the betterment of the student
athlete).
149
NCAA Mission and Vision Statements Analysis, supra note 7 (illustrating that the
NCAA’s viewership argument is wholly incompatible with its desire to enhance the
educational experience of the student athlete and showing the lack of credibility in such an
argument by the NCAA).
150
See Jon Lewis, Five Week One College Football Games Top Five Million Viewers,
SPORTS MEDIA WATCH (Sept. 2021), https://www.sportsmediawatch.com/2021/09/collegefootball-ratings-week-one-clemson-georgia-notre-dame-fsu/; see also 2021 College
Football TV Ratings, SPORTS MEDIA WATCH, https://www.sportsmediawatch.com/2021college-football-tv-ratings-page/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2022) (highlighting that the 2021
regular season matchup between Ohio State University and the University of Michigan, a
historic college football rivalry dating back approximately a century, notched the highest
college football regular season audience in more than two years with above an 8.0 overall
rating and fifteen million viewers as Michigan ultimately triumphed in the game for the
first time since 2011).
151
See id. (emphasizing that such rivalry games are a strong barometer to assess fan
engagement and interest throughout the college football season).
152
Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2152 (quoting In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust
Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2019)); see, e.g. Darryn Albert, LaMelo Ball
Does Not Regret Skipping College One Bit, LARRY BROWN SPORTS (Aug. 17, 2021),
https://larrybrownsports.com/basketball/lamelo-ball-not-regret-skipping-college/582721
(explaining that LaMelo Ball chose to forgo a collegiate basketball career in the NCAA
after previously committing to UCLA and instead played overseas in both Lithuania and
Australia after finishing high school before joining the NBA, which is an unconventional
and rare path for an aspiring professional athlete to take).
148

70

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:1

the respective professional draft for their sport out of high school. 153 While
in recent years alternatives to the NCAA have arisen such as the eXtreme
Football League (XFL) 154, the National Basketball Association (NBA) G
League (G League) 155, the United Soccer League Championship
(USLC) 156, and the American Association of Professional Baseball
(AAPB) 157, “elite student athletes [still] lack any viable alternatives to
Division I, [and] they are forced to accept, to the extent they want to attend
college and play sports at an elite level after high school, whatever
compensation is offered to them by Division I schools.” 158
The district court noted that the student athletes shouldered the burden
of proof to demonstrate that substantially less restrictive alternative rules
instituted by the NCAA could achieve the same procompetitive effect as
the NCAA’s current compensation restraints, which provide the NCAA
significant leeway in running its enterprise and controlling student
See Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2152 (noting that the NCAA provides high school athletes
the clearest path to a professional athletic career) This is contrasted with a career playing
overseas or playing professionally out of high school.
154
See generally Les Carpenter, What Is the XFL? The Newest Professional Football
League, Explained, WASH. POST (Feb. 6, 2020, 9:16 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/sports/2020/02/06/what-is-xfl/ (illustrating that the XFL is composed of eight teams
that play a ten game season with a mid-April championship as an attempt to give football
fans a dose of spring football while the NFL lies dormant).
155
See generally What You Need to Know About the NBA G League, NBA G LEAGUE,
https://gleague.nba.com/about/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2022) (describing the G League as “the
NBA’s official minor league” that features twenty-nine teams and focuses on developing
young players and foreign players to prepare them for potential NBA careers).
156
See generally, About, USL, https://www.uslchampionship.com/about (last visited Oct.
10, 2022) (explaining that the USL Championship is a premier Division II North American
soccer league behind the popular Division I Major League Soccer (MLS) where young
players and foreign players can develop their skills to possibly ascend to a higher level in
the United States or for an opportunity to join a foreign club).
157
See generally Kevin Reichard, American Association, Frontier League Now MLB
Partner Leagues, BALLPARK DIG. (Sept. 24, 2020), https://ballparkdigest.com/2020/09/24/
american-association-frontier-league-now-mlb-partner-leagues/ (noting that the AAPB, a
leading independent league along with the Frontier League and Atlantic League, recently
became an official MLB partner league in 2020 and currently serves as a league for
undrafted and foreign players to improve their game and ascend to the MLB).
158
Hayes Rule, A Breakdown of Alston v. NCAA: What Is the Future of Paying College
Athletes, and What Would It Mean for Athletes to Be Paid?, MEDIUM (May 4, 2019),
https://medium.com/the-bearfaced-truth/a-breakdown-of-alston-v-ncaa-what-is-the-future-ofpaying-college-athletes-3483569905b4; see also Jeré Longman & Alanis Thames, Forget
Friday Night Lights: High School Stars Seek a Better Deal, THE N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/13/sports/ncaa-high-school-sports-endorsements.html
(noting that in the wake of the Alston decision, it is likely that all states will spend time
contemplating whether to adequately reassess their rules, “in light of what Robert Zayas, the
executive director of the New York State Public High School Athletic Association, describes
as increasing difficulty of differentiating ‘between a student capitalizing on their athletic fame
and being a social media influencer’”).
153
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athletes. 159 Moreover, the district court upheld the NCAA’s compensation
rules, which limited grant-in-aid athletic scholarships to the full cost of
attendance for the respective college or university and compensation
restrictions unrelated to education in the hopes of avoiding further blurring
the line between collegiate and professional sports. 160 However, the
district court found that education benefits—rules “limit[ing] scholarships
for graduate or vocational school, payments for academic tutoring, or paid
posteligibility internships”—were easily distinguishable from a
professional athlete’s salary and thus enjoined the NCAA’s restrictions on
education-related benefits for student athletes. 161
After the district court enjoined certain NCAA rules limiting the
education-related benefits that schools could provide to student-athletes,
both parties appealed to the Ninth Circuit.162 The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the district court’s holding in full, ruling that the district court “struck the
right balance in crafting a remedy that both prevents anticompetitive harm
to Student-athletes while serving the procompetitive purpose of preserving
the popularity of college sports.” 163 The NCAA was again dissatisfied and
filed a certiorari petition, which the Supreme Court granted in part to
consider the subset of NCAA rules restricting education-related benefits
that the district court enjoined. 164

See Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2153 (describing that the student athletes were substantially
able to meet this burden of proof by showing that the NCAA did not need to have such
airtight restrictions on student athletes’ monetary compensation ability to achieve their
desire of preserving the academic and athletic benefits it boasts in its Mission Statement).
160
See id. at 2153-54 (placing an emphasis on drawing the line between education-related
and non-education-related benefits for student athletes to avoid opening Pandora’s Box to
all the possibilities, some of which may be potentially unsavory, of non-education-related
benefits for student athletes).
161
Id. at 2153; see also Brett Friedlander, New NCAA Athlete Compensation Rules: What
is and isn’t Allowed, THE NORTH STATE JOURNAL (Apr. 30, 2020), https://nsjonline.
com/article/2020/04/new-ncaa-athlete-compensation-rules-what-is-and-isnt-allowed/
(noting that while the NIL landscape is largely unsettled and much like the wild west, it is
foreseeable that the NCAA will prohibit student athletes from promoting alcohol, tobacco,
sports gambling, and other areas of possible disrepute to preserve the image of the NCAA,
their conference, and their school).
162
See Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2144 (noting that the NCAA challenged the district court
enjoining its rules and implementing education-related NIL compensation benefits while
the student athletes appealed the decision for not going far enough, seeking NIL
compensation benefits in other areas past the realm of education).
163
In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958 F.3d 1239, 1263 (9th Cir.
2020).
164
See Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2144 (Noting that in granting the NCAA’s certiorari petition,
the Court made clear that it would only be assessing the narrow issue of the NCAA’s rules
restricting student athletes’ education-related benefits from their NIL).
159
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B. Supreme Court Proceedings in Alston: Justice Gorsuch’s
Agreement with the District Court’s Rule of Reason Analysis and
Condemnation of the NCAA’s Compensation Restraints
Authoring the majority opinion in Alston, Justice Gorsuch first
emphasized the fact that the NCAA is “a massive commercial enterprise”
rather than simply a “nonprofit entity upholding educational ideals and
high-minded conceptions of amateurism.” 165 Justice Gorsuch explicitly
noted that at its core, the leaders of the NCAA “profit in a very different
way than the student-athletes whose activities they oversee,” with NCAA
President Mark Emmert earning almost $4 million annually. 166 Justice
Gorsuch further notes that the commissioners of the top conferences such
as the Southeastern Conference (SEC), Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC),
PAC 12, BIG 10, and BIG 12 earn between $2 million and $5 million
annually, and college athletic directors bring home more than $1 million
per year. 167 For the NCAA as a whole, the numbers are even more
staggering—and continue to consistently increase by the year—with its
current broadcast contract for the March Madness basketball tournament
reaching $1.1 billion annually, its television deal for the FBS College
Football Playoff (CFP) ascending to $470 million per year, and Division I
conferences such as the SEC earning more than $650 million in 2017. 168
In the first weekend of the 2021 FBS season, five college football
games averaged at least five million viewers, which was the most in the
opening week of FBS football since 2016. 169 Further, FBS broadcasting
ratings were up 16% and viewership was up 29% from the comparable
2019 window while the ratings for out-of-home viewership—watching a
game live in the stadium or at a recreational viewing venue outside the
Somin, supra note 142 (highlighting the unique nature of the NCAA’s organizational
structure and its designation as a non-profit that emphasizes student athlete education while
grossing over $1 billion dollars each year in college basketball alone with the NCAA
Tournament); see also Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2150-51..
166
Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2151. This fact of Emmert’s notable salary while many student
athletes are not even able to accept a free meal from a donor to the school demonstrates the
wealth disparity inherent to the NCAA’s organizational structure as well as the misnomer
that the NCAA is a nonprofit solely focused on the wellbeing of its student athletes. Id.
167
See id. (noting that even the heads of each major NCAA conference and the athletic
directors at more competitive schools significant outpace the monetary gains of the
majority of Division I college coaches in the nation while the student athletes cannot profit
off their own NIL).
168
See id. at 2150–51 (emphasizing that the NCAA has a consistent revenue stream from
the major events in its highest revenue grossing sports that provides predictability and
stability to its financial infrastructure).
169
See Paulsen, supra note 150 (noting that in the first weekend of the first major sporting
event since the Alston decision was released by the Supreme Court, college football
recorded certain viewership statistics that were the highest in half a decade); see generally
Alston, 141 S. Ct.
165
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home—also increased by 11%. 170 This empirical data lines up
substantially with the expert testimony and other relevant evidence
brought by the student athletes in Alston, highlighting that “consumer
demand has increased markedly despite the new types of compensation
the NCAA has allowed in recent decades” and that “further increases in
student-athlete compensation would ‘not negatively affect consumer
demand.’” 171
While accounting for the COVID-19 pandemic’s potential effect on
viewership statistics, this trend in viewership continued strongly
throughout the entirety of the 2021 college football season as each of the
six bowl games that annually take place on New Year’s Eve surpassed 7.5
million viewers for just the third time in the CFP era.172 Moreover, 25.9
million viewers tuned in to the two CFP Semifinal games on the ESPN
networks, which marked the highest total since the first year of the CFP
era in 2014, and the Capital One Orange Bowl between the University of
Georgia and the University of Michigan was dubbed “the most-viewed
non-NFL sporting event across any network, and top telecast across ABC
and ESPN networks since last year’s CFP National Championship
game.” 173 Additionally, this increase in viewership applies across other
collegiate sports, notably in college basketball with several all-time
milestones in First Four—the four teams that play against each other to
See Paulsen, supra note 150 (supporting the student athletes and refuting the NCAA’s
viewership argument by breaking the relevant statistics down further to illustrate that even
the out-of-home viewership for college football increased after the Alston decision as well);
see generally Alston, 141 S. Ct.
171
Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2153; see also Ross, supra note 96 (referencing the research of
Robert G. Noll whose expert testimony specifically on the NCAA’s viewership statistics
runs contrary to the NCAA’s proffered argument as viewership has continued to increase
despite student athletes being afforded education-related NIL benefits).
172
See Amanda Brooks, New Year’s Six Delivers Multi-Year Viewership Highs, SecondMost-Watched Non-Semifinal Rose Bowl Game of College Football Playoff Era, ESPN
PRESS ROOM (Jan. 4, 2022), https://espnpressroom.com/us/press-releases/2022/01/newyears-six-delivers-multi-year-viewership-highs-second-most-watched-non-semifinalrose-bowl-game-of-college-football-playoff-era/. Brooks interestingly notes that even the
non-Semifinal New Year’s Six bowl games, which are outside of the College Football
Playoff four-team structure, averaged approximately 11 million viewers and ranked third
out of the eight years the College Football Playoff has been in existence. Id. Brooks further
breaks down the viewership statistics the Rose Bowl Game Presented by Capital One
Venture X between the University of Utah and Ohio State University logged 16.6 million
viewers, which was the second-most viewed non-Semifinal New Year’s Six bowl game of
the CFP Era behind the 2019 clash between Ohio State University and the University of
Washington, which recorded 16.9 million viewers. See also id.
173
See id. (highlighting that at the most crucial time of the college football season, the
CFP, the fans set the highest mark in the CFP era, showing that the Alston decision
unequivocally did not have an adverse effect on viewership); see generally Alston, 141 S.
Ct. at 2141.
170
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begin the annual NCAA college basketball tournament—coverage that
included a gross audience of 7.6 million viewers, which beat the previous
record by 24%. 174
After analyzing the NCAA’s anticompetitive effects on the studentathlete labor market under the Rule of Reason and rejecting the NCAA’s
amateurism and viewership procompetitive arguments, the Court
recognized an antitrust remedy was necessary for the student athletes but
also acknowledged that “in fashioning an antitrust remedy . . . caution is
key.” 175 Justice Gorsuch notes that the district court resisted the temptation
that befalls antitrust judges “to require that enterprises employ the least
restrictive means of achieving their legitimate business objectives” while
also “remain[ing] aware that markets are often more effective than the
heavy hand of judicial power when it comes to enhancing consumer
welfare.” 176 Justice Gorsuch further opined that the district court’s Rule of
Reason analysis exhausted the factual record through a thorough legal
analysis consistent with antitrust principles and correctly identified the
NCAA’s violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. 177 Despite recognizing that
“[s]ome [individuals] will think the district court did not go far enough”
in limiting the student athletes’ remedy to education-related benefits,
Justice Gorsuch concludes the opinion by agreeing with the Ninth Circuit
in that the Court’s task “is simply to review the district court judgment
through the appropriate lens of antitrust law.” 178

174

See 2021 NCAA First Four on TBS and truTV is Most-Watched Ever, Including Gross
Audience of 7.6 Million Cross-Platform Viewers, NCAA.COM (Mar. 19, 2021), https://
www.ncaa.com/news/basketball-men/article/2021-03-19/2021-ncaa-first-four-tbs-andtrutv-most-watched-ever-including-gross-audience-76 (noting that in addition to a 36%
increase in viewership for TBS and truTV’s live game coverage compared to 2019’s
comparable telecasts, the UCLA v. Michigan State University game became the mostwatched First Four game since its inception in 2011 with an average of nearly three million
viewers).
175
Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2166 (explaining that assigning an antitrust remedy following a
Rule of Reason analysis for a corporation is a nuanced process due to the potential
ramifications on a variety of parties, here the parties being the conferences, schools, and
student athletes,).
176
Id. at 2165-66 (Justice Gorsuch highlighting the challenge the Court faced in
determining a remedy for student athletes despite its unanimous decision in Alston that the
NCAA’s compensation restraints violated § 1 of the Sherman Act).
177
See id. at 2166 (emphasizing again the reliance of the Supreme Court on Judge
Wilken’s district court Rule of Reason analysis and review of the relevant facts to explain
why the Court spent the majority of its opinion recounting the district court’s analysis).
178
See id. (quoting In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958 F.3d
1239, 1265 (9th Cir. 2020) (explaining Justice Gorsuch’s emphasis on the duty to review
district court judgments in antitrust cases).
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C. Justice Kavanaugh’s Fiery Concurrence in Alston: Attacking
and Disproving the NCAA’s Procompetitive Viewership
Justification
Analogously, Justice Kavanaugh in his concurrence drew several
examples to rebut the NCAA’s viewership argument:
The NCAA couches its arguments for not paying student
athletes in innocuous labels. But the labels cannot
disguise the reality: The NCAA’s business model would
be flatly illegal in almost any other industry in America.
All of the restaurants in a region cannot come together to
cut cooks’ wages on the theory that “customers prefer” to
eat food from low-paid cooks. Law firms cannot conspire
to cabin lawyers’ salaries in the name of providing legal
services out of a “love of the law.” Hospitals cannot agree
to cap nurses’ income in order to create a ‘purer’ form of
helping the sick. News organizations cannot join forces
to curtail pay to reporters to preserve a “tradition’ of
public-minded journalism. Movie studios cannot collude
to slash benefits to camera crews to kindle a ‘spirit of
amateurism.’ 179
As indicated by this quote, Justice Kavanaugh “took a sharp turn from
the measured approach in criticizing the NCAA arguments offered in the
principal opinion penned by Justice Neil Gorsuch,” and his words serve as
a somewhat ominous rallying cry to supporters of the student-athlete
plaintiffs in Alston following the Court’s decision. 180 This flows naturally
from Justice Kavanaugh’s aggressive approach during oral arguments in
questioning the NCAA lawyers on March 31, 2021, where he stated, “It
does seem . . . schools are conspiring with competitors—agreeing with
competitors, let’s say that—to pay no salaries for the workers who are
making the school billions of dollars on the theory that consumers want
the schools to pay their workers nothing.” 181 Justice Kavanaugh digs even
deeper, citing a brief, filed by a group of African-American antitrust
lawyers illustrating that while colleges have the luxury of building lavish
new buildings and facilities based on the income that the student athletes,
many of these student athletes come from lower-income AfricanNCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2167 (2021) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
Gregory, supra note 1 (explaining that Justice Kavanaugh’s quotes regarding Alston
are often referred to in both scholarly and non-scholarly articles on education-related NIL
benefits).
181
See Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2149 (citing Tr. of Oral Arg. 35).
179
180
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American backgrounds and are left with no monetary compensation for
their efforts on the court, field, ice, or in the pool. 182
It is illogical to argue that an individual enjoys frequenting an upscale,
high-class restaurant particularly because the cooks who prepare the food
at that restaurant are not being compensated for their service in cooking
the patrons’ food. 183 The NCAA attempts to use the same logic to argue
that fans of collegiate athletics specifically enjoy watching student athletes
participate in NCAA athletics because the student athletes are not being
paid to play in the games, but this argument is unsupported by commonsense logic and falls flat. 184 The NCAA does not have any credible
empirical data to support the claim that collegiate sports fans choose to
watch NCAA athletes compete due to the fact that the student athletes are
not paid, and there is similarly a lack of empirical evidence suggesting that
these collegiate sports fans will cease to watch NCAA games if student
athletes are compensated for their performance. 185

See id.; see also Patrick A. Bradford et al., March Madness Exploits Black Athletes.
The Supreme Court Should End This Injustice Now, TIME (Mar. 30, 2021, 2:19 PM),
https://time.com/5951097/ncaa-v-alston-march-madness-exploitation/; see also Akuoma
C. Nwadike et al., Racism in the NCAA and the Racial Implications of the “2.3 or Take a
Knee” Legislation, 26 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 523, 538 (2016) (describing that the NCAA
has failed one of its main contemporary goals of “maximize[ing] academic success and
minimiz[ing] [the] adverse impact on low-income and minority student-athletes”).
183
See Alston, 141 s. Ct. at 2167 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (analogizing the NCAA’s
argument in layman’s terms and grabbing the attention of the general public in
contemplating the student athlete NIL issue).
184
See id.; Eric Boehm, NCAA Can’t Ban Colleges from Compensating Athletes,
Supreme Court Says, REASON.COM (Jun. 21, 2021, 4:00 PM), https://reason.com/2021/
06/21/ncaa-cant-ban-schools-from-compensating-college-athletes-supreme-court-says/
(noting that amidst its arguments at the Supreme Court level, the NCAA stated that the
lower court’s ruling in Alston’s favor would “fundamentally transform the century-old
institution of NCAA sports, blurring the traditional line between college and professional
athletes” should the ruling stand).
185
See Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2167 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). But see Brian Welch,
Unconscionable Amateurism: How the NCAA Violates Antitrust by Forcing Athletes to
Sign Away Their Image Rights, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 533, 548 (2011) (providing
evidence that in the past, although the NCAA has failed to provide credible evidence for
their viewership argument in Alston, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania in Pocono Invitational Sports Camp v. NCAA, 317 F. Supp. 2d 569 (E.D. Pa.
2004) strongly emphasized the NCAA’s recruiting rules were immune from antitrust
scrutiny, maintaining that the NCAA’s regulations “have been upheld as protection of
amateurism in student-athlete challenges and non-student-athlete challenges alike . . . .”).
182
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III. THE RULE OF REASON AND WHY AMERICAN NEEDLE V.
NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE EXPOSES THE NCAA’S PRICE FIXING
AND HORIZONTAL RESTRAINTS ON COMPETITION
Just over a decade prior to its release of the Alston decision, the Court
held in American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League that individual
teams’ licensing activities for their intellectual property, conducted
through a corporation (American Needle) separate from the organizations
and with its own unique management, constituted concerted action that
was not categorically beyond the coverage of § 1 of the Sherman Act. 186
In this case, while the majority of NFL apparel rights were sold through
NFL Properties (NFLP), a few companies such as American Needle
contracted with individual teams to sell only that team’s apparel through
the NFLP’s nonexclusive licensing scheme.187 In 2000, the thirty-two NFL
teams authorized NFLP to issue exclusive licenses to sell each team’s
apparel and merchandise.188 As a result, NFLP declined to renew its
contract with American Needle and instead signed an exclusive contract
with Reebok International Ltd. (Reebok, Inc.), which resulted in American
Needle losing the licensing from which it profited for twenty years. 189
American Needle then filed suit in the Northern District of Illinois against
the thirty-two NFL teams, the NFL, the NFLP, and Reebok, Inc. as
collective defendants claiming that the agreement at issue constituted a
violation of both § 1 and § 2 of the Sherman Act. 190
Applying the Rule of Reason analysis in a similar manner to the Court
in Alston and its progeny, Justice Stevens led the charge for the Court in
American Needle in scrutinizing the thirty-two professional teams in the
NFL and ultimately determined that the teams “competed with each other
not just on the field but to attract fans, for gate receipts, for contracts with
managerial and playing personnel, and in the market for intellectual

American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 183 (2010)
[hereinafter American Needle].
187
See id.; see also Alan J. Meese, Will the Supreme Court Recover its Own Fumble?
How Alston Can Repair the Damage Resulting from NCAA’s Sports League Exemption, 11
WAKE FOREST L. REV. ONLINE 70 (2021) (explaining that the Court embraced the logic of
the Seventh Circuit in its dicta by holding that a NCAA Bylaw is “presumed
procompetitive” when it is “clearly meant to help maintain the ‘revered tradition of
amateurism in college sports’ or the ‘preservation of the student athlete in higher
education’”).
188
See American Needle, 560 U.S. at 183.
189
See Daniel A. Schwartz, Shutting the Black Door: Using American Needle to Cure
the Problem of Improper Product Definition, 110 MICH. L. REV. 295, 313 (2011).
190
See Katherine Kaso-Howard, American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League:
Justice Stevens’ Last Twinkling of an Eye, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1163, 1166 (2011).
186
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property.” 191 In determining if there was a violation of § 1 of the Sherman
Act, the Court focused on whether the conduct of the thirty-two NFL
teams, joining together as separate decision makers—similar to that of the
NCAA member institutions—deprived the cognizable labor market of
“independent centers of decisionmaking.” 192 While the NFL teams
attempted to provide a “single entity theory,” the Court sharply rejected
their argument, stating that the teams did not possess a “unitary
decisionmaking quality” and clarified that merely because “the financial
performance of a team is related to other teams does not mean it
necessarily rises and falls with that of the others.” 193
Notably, the Court determined that because each team was a
“substantial, independently owned and independently managed business
and that each team’s general corporate actions were guided by a ‘separate
corporate consciousness,’” each team was thus responsible for its own
intellectual property. 194 The Court added that when a specific NFL team—
for example, the New Orleans Saints—licenses its intellectual property to
a clothing company for merchandise production, it is not acting for the
betterment of the entire NFL but rather solely for the prosperity of its own
organization. 195 In American Needle, the NLFP’s licensing decisions are
made by the thirty-two potential competitors, and each of the teams

See Roxane A. Polidora, C. Douglas Floyd & Marley Degner, In American Needle v.
NFL, Supreme Court Holds That NFL Joint Venture is Subject to Antitrust Scrutiny Under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, PILLSBURY LAW (Jun. 9, 2010), https://www.pillsburylaw.
com/en/news-and-insights/in-american-needle-v-nfl-supreme-court-holds-that-nfl-joint.
html (highlighting that the Court in American Needle ultimately held that the thirty-two
NFL teams were unable to escape antitrust scrutiny for the decisions they made regarding
their respective and separately owned intellectual property rights by acting through a
separately managed entity—NFL Properties).
192
See American Needle, 560 U.S. at 193–94 (quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Independent
Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984)).
193
See Mike Kurtz & Tom Gower, Breaking Down the American Needle Case,
FOOTBALL OUTSIDERS (May 26, 2010), http://people.stern.nyu.edu/wgreene/entertainment
andmedia/AmericanNeedle.pdf (noting that the Court looked at the totality of
circumstances to determine how much of a restraint on trade resulted from the agreement
between NFL Properties and the thirty-two NFL teams to assess its reasonability). While
the most famous and well-documented per se violation is an agreement between
competitors to fix prices, Kurtz and Gower emphasize that the Court’s in-depth look into a
situation such as the one present in American Needle involved “the intent of the
conspirators, probable consequences, market conditions, and any number of other factors
which led to the agreement.”) Id. Further, Kurtz and Gower explicitly note that in the last
sentence of the Court’s American Needle opinion, the Court directed the district court to
apply the Rule of Reason analysis “because the product the teams have conspired to sell
(the merchandising) could not exist without such an agreement.” Id.
194
See American Needle, 560 U.S. at 195 (quoting Copperweld Corp., 467 U.S. at 771).
195
See id. (citing Copperweld Corp., 467 U.S. at 770).
191
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actually owns its share of the jointly managed assets.196 Thus, despite the
NLFP being a separate corporation with its own management” and the fact
that most of the revenues generated by the NFLP are shared by the teams
on an equal basis, the NLFP’s decisions constitute concerted action, and
its conduct is subject to § 1 of the Sherman Act similar to the conduct of
the NFL’s thirty-two teams. 197
Linking this back to Alston, while some sports organizations and
governing bodies act as a unified, single entity seemingly immune from
antitrust scrutiny, the NCAA exists as a joint venture by definition—a
commercial enterprise undertaken jointly by two or more parties which
otherwise retain their distinct identities—involving the NCAA body and
the conferences comprised of its member institutions. 198 At its core, the
NCAA consists of its member colleges and universities “that have joined
together to create the rules and regulations associated with collegiate
sports,” and the NCAA’s “operation of what may otherwise be viewed as
a beneficial joint venture are subject to antitrust scrutiny.” 199 The NCAA’s
rules and regulations lack a clear tie to a cognizable labor market, and its
horizontal restraint is not sufficient in bringing the product—the student
athletes and their athletic performance in NCAA competitions—to
market. 200 The NCAA is thus restricting the quantity of its product to raise
196
See id. at 197. Because each team owns its individualized share of the jointly managed
assets, it would be implausible that the teams are acting in the best interest of the NFL as a
single entity as opposed to furthering their unique financial goals as a separate franchise
within the league. Id.
197
See U.S. Supreme Court Decision Revisits Meaning of “Contract, Combination or
Conspiracy” Under §1 of the Sherman Act, GIBSON DUNN (Jun. 1, 2010), https://www.
gibsondunn.com/u-s-supreme-court-decision-revisits-meaning-of-contract-combinationor-conspiracy-under-%C2%A71-of-the-sherman-act/.
198
See American Needle, 560 U.S. at 185 (noting that in determining whether antitrust
scrutiny is appropriate for the governing body of a sports organization, one that acts as a
unified, single entity in its decision-making would be immune from such scrutiny while
one with self-interested parties within the organization—as in the NFL and NCAA—are
properly subject to antitrust scrutiny).
199
W. Todd Miller, More to Supreme Court’s NCAA Decision Than Just Sports, BAKER
& MILLER 1, 2 (July 1, 2021), https://bakerandmiller.com/more-to-supreme-courts-ncaadecision-than-just-sports/ (describing that the Alston case interestingly reinforces an
important 36-year-old lesson that when a company or joint venture decides to make an
important alteration to its method for conducting business that may have an impact on other
individuals or entities, “it must pause and ensure that those changes are justifiable from an
antitrust standpoint” as well as “think more broadly and question whether those changes
undermine the rationales given for other behaviors” that similarly have the ability to impact
other individuals or entities).
200
See id. (highlighting the crux of the NCAA’s price fixing violation of § 1 of the
Sherman Act in unreasonably restraining the student athletes—the genus of the NCAA’s
cognizable labor market—by not compensating them for their NIL through the
implementation of horizontal restraints to stifle its cognizable labor market).
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the price and show market power over its product—the student athletes
who compete in Division I, Division II, and Division III athletics—which
led Justice Kavanaugh in his Alston concurrence to label this as clear price
fixing. 201 Within the cognizable student-athlete labor market, the
multitude of conferences within the various NCAA divisions provides
student athletes the option to transfer to a school in a different conference
should they so choose. 202

IV. THE IMPACT AND SIGNIFICANCE OF A NEW CONFERENCEDRIVEN COMPETITIVE MODEL REPLACING THE NCAA’S HUB-ANDSPOKE CARTEL
To look ahead at what compensating student athletes for their NIL
may manifest in the future, it is first necessary to harken back to 1989,
where, five years after the Supreme Court’s decision in Board of Regents,
the NCAA established the Cost Reduction Committee 203. 204 This
Committee quickly adopted the “Restricted Earnings Coach Rule” in the
NCAA bylaws in 1991, which subsequently limited the annual
compensation of some Division I entry-level coaches to a maximum of
$16,000 per year. 205 In response, a collection of approximately 1,900
NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141,2167 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
202
See id. At the crux of the NIL issue and in accordance with the Fair Pay to Play
legislation in many states across the country, the inherent competition between conferences
makes transfer possibilities a larger leverage point for student athletes in being able to
transfer to a school that provides them with a greater opportunity to profit off their NIL.
Id.
203
See Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010,1019–20 (10th Cir. 1998) (explaining that the
NCAA established the Cost Reduction Committee to consider means and strategies for
reducing the costs of intercollegiate athletics without disturbing the competitive
balance among NCAA member institutions, and the Committee found that reducing the
total number of coaching positions would accomplish the goal of reducing the cost of
athletic programs).
204
See generally NCAA Restricted Earning Coaches Rule, COLLEGE SPORTS
SCHOLARSHIPS, https://www.collegesportsscholarships.com/ncaa-coach-restricted-earning
s.htm (describing that as a result of the 1,900 restricted-earnings coaches suing the NCAA
under the “Restricted Earnings Coach Rule”—subject NCAA Bylaw 11.02.3 and adopted
by a roughly 85 to 15 percent margin—the NCAA “was ordered to pay damages of $11.2
million to basketball coaches, $1.6 million to baseball coaches and $9.5 million to coaches
in other sports despite the NCAA’s protests that only fifty-nine college coaches were
actually injured by the Restricted Earnings Coach Rule, which would have come out to less
than $900,000). As a result of the class action lawsuit brought by the restricted-earnings
coaches, this decision now has served as a “$67 million millstone around the [NCAA]’s
neck” for decades. Id.
205
See id.; see also AB Staff, Out of Cost Control, ATHLETIC BUSINESS (Jun. 30, 1998),
https://www.athleticbusiness.com/operations/article/15140643/out-of-cost-control.
201
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college coaches from various sports and schools across the nation filed a
class action suit against the NCAA claiming that the NCAA had violated
§ 1 of the Sherman Act with the “restricted earnings coach” rule that set a
cap of NCAA coaches’ pay. 206
In Law v. NCAA, the NCAA fell back on its position in Board of
Regents, asserting it lacked any market power to support its bylaw, but the
Tenth Circuit followed the Supreme Court’s precedent and rejected this
argument, noting that an apparent lack of market power does not excuse
an apparent restriction on price or output. 207 The NCAA has relied on
dissected fragments from this thirty-seven-year-old opinion in litigation in
the subsequent decades, honing in specifically on the following quote:
The NCAA plays a critical role in the maintenance of a
revered tradition of amateurism in college sports. There
can be no question but that it needs ample latitude to play
that role, or that the preservation of the student-athlete in
higher education adds richness and diversity to
intercollegiate athletics and is entirely consistent with the
goals of the Sherman Act. 208
However, the Alston Court explicitly rejected this argument and found
that this often-cited language by the NCAA from the Court’s decision
in Board of Regents “was inapplicable to questions of athlete
compensation” and that this language was mere dicta “that could not
insulate the NCAA from antitrust scrutiny.” 209 To this point on the dicta
206
See Law, 143 F.3d at 1019–20. The sheer number of college coaches that band
together to fight the NCAA’s Restricted Earnings Coaching Rule help garner national
attention as well as increased scrutiny on the validity of the NCAA’s restrictions and
regulations. Id.
207
See id. at 1020. The NCAA had relied on this specific position from Board of Regents
for decades to come and even continued to cite dicta from the Court’s decision in Board of
Regents in its arguments in Alston almost forty years later. Id.
208
See Gregory, supra note 1 (citing NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 88
(1984)).
209
Gregory A. Marino, NCAA v. Alston: The Beginning of the End or the End of the
Beginning?, FOLEY & LARDNER, LLP (Aug. 4, 2021), https://www.foley.com/en/insights/
publications/2021/08/ncaa-v-alston (explaining that even though the Court generally
agreed with a number of the NCAA’s arguments—”most notably that antitrust law does
not require it to use anything like the least restrictive means of achieving its legitimate
business purposes, and that Congressional action on student-athlete benefits would best
serve all parties”—the Court specifically hones in on the NCAA’s regulations concerning
student-athlete educational benefits in its decision). Within the macrocosm of the antitrust
war between the NCAA and its student athletes, the Alston decision was incredibly
significant, but Marino notes that “[e]ven as [the Court] demolished the NCAA’s
procompetitive argument, the Court explained to the NCAA that, all things considered, it
was getting off rather easy,” but it is unclear how long the Court will hold back from
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from the Board of Regents decision, the Alston Court further noted that the
NCAA failed to produce any meaningful economic analysis concerning
how or why the consumer market for NCAA athletics “might be
irrevocably destroyed by teenage athletes receiving from their schools
unrestrained educational benefits.” 210 Moreover, in contrast, the Alston
Court explained that the student-athlete plaintiffs were able to meet their
burden of proof and definitively show through empirical evidence that the
popularity and viewership for NCAA athletics has undoubtedly increased
in the time period following the new allowances for student-athlete
educational benefit allocation. 211
Following Law v. NCAA, Division I college coaches now possess their
own defined and established labor market, and in the twenty-first century,
Division I college coaches across multiple sports have made headlines for
their impressive annual salary figures.212 This has grown to the point
where a Division I college football or men’s college basketball coach is
the highest paid public employee in forty states, led by the University of

possibly adopting a fierier approach against the NCAA as Justice Kavanaugh advocates for
in his concurrence. Id.
210
Id. But see Daniel Libit, NCAA’s Nobel Prize-Winning Expert Witness Sounds Off on
Alston, NIL, YAHOO! SPORTS (Jul. 12, 2021), https://sports.yahoo.com/ncaa-nobel-prizewinning-expert-130056070.html?fr=yhssrp_catchall (expanding on James Heckman’s, the
renowned University of Chicago economist and staunch defender of the NCAA’s model,
disapproval of the Court’s decision in Alston and the expansion of NIL rights for student
athletes) (emphasis in original).
211
See NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2167 (2021) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring)
(emphasizing that the student athletes use of empirical evidence and the NCAA’s lack
thereof was particularly persuasive to the Court in deciding that the student-athlete
plaintiffs met their burden).
212
See generally Charlotte Gibson, Who is the Highest-Paid in Your State?, ESPN.COM,
http://www.espn.com/espn/feature/story?id=28261213&_slug_=dabo-swinney-edorgeron-highest-paid-state-employees&redirected=true (illustrating that as a breakdown of
the forty college coaches who are the highest paid public employees in their state, twelve
are men’s college basketball coaches and the remaining twenty-eight are college football
coaches). Of the top fourteen highest paid college coaches in the country, there is only one
college basketball coach in that group: John Calipari, the legendary Head Coach for the
University of Kentucky Wildcats with an annual salary of $9.3 million. Id. To further
illustrate the massive wealth difference between college football coaches and governors,
specifically, the four College Football Playoff coaches in 2019 accrued four times as much
as the 50 state governors earned at $6.9 million. Id.
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Alabama head football coach Nick Saban who brought in $9.75 million in
2021 213 and has an approximate net worth of $60 million. 214
The development over the past three decades of the NCAA eventually
relinquishing its control over coaches’ salaries judicially mirrors the
NCAA cession of control over student athletes’ NIL in the Alston decision
because college athletes have recently gained significant support in the
court of public opinion. 215 In protest, NCAA supporters raise several
arguments as to why the Alston decision should not be expanded in a
manner similar to coaches’ salaries. 216 One pro-NCAA concern that is
commonly raised proffers that if student athletes are able to accrue
millions of dollars through their NIL at larger schools, smaller Division I,
Division II, and Division III schools will suffer as a result. 217 This is

Michael Casagrande, Nick Saban Again Nation’s Highest Paid College Football
Coach, AL.COM (Oct. 14, 2021), https://www.al.com/alabamafootball/2021/10/nick-saban
-again-nations-highest-paid-college-football-coach.html; see also Matt Johnson, Alabama
Signs Nick Saban to Lucrative Contract Extension Through 2028, SPORTSNAUT (Jun. 7,
2021),
https://sportsnaut.com/alabama-crimson-tide-nick-saban-contract-extension/
(describing how Saban has ascended to the highly respected status of “the greatest coach
in college football history” since first signing with the University of Alabama in 2007, and
after winning the National Championship game for the seventh time in 2021, Saban signed
a multi-year contract extension that reflects his legendary prowess and firmly supplants
him as the highest paid college football coach in the nation).
214
See Gibson, supra note 212; see also Alabama State Government Salary,
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Alabama_state_government_salary (listing out the
respective salaries of state executives in the State of Alabama led by Steve Marshall, the
Attorney General of Alabama with approximately $168,000 per year followed closely by
Jim Ridling, the Alabama Commissioner of Insurance, with $164,419 per year). Kat Ivey,
the current Governor of Alabama, ranks fifth for highest paid state executive in Alabama
with a salary of just under $28,000 per year based on the fifteen current state executives
listed. Id.
215
See generally Arash Afshar, Collegiate Athletes: The Conflict Between NCAA
Amateurism and a Student Athletes’ Right of Publicity, 51 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 101, 120–
21 (2015); see infra discussion Part V. (hypothesizing that, in accordance with Justice
Kavanaugh’s concurrence in Alston, the NCAA will continue to relinquish its control over
student athletes profiting from their NIL until the conferences overtake the NCAA’s huband-spoke cartel and are placed in charge of placing their own monetary restrictions on
student athletes).
216
See Keller, infra note 217 and accompanying text.
217
See Braly Keller, NIL for Division II and Division III Institutions, OPENDORSE (Aug. 18,
2021),
https://opendorse.com/blog/nil-for-division-ii-and-division-iii-institutions-2/
(explaining that Division II and Division III student athletes “will have the same
opportunities to monetize their NIL as the rest of the general student body” by having the
ability to “reference their athletic involvement when promoting camps or clinics, cash in
on their social media platforms with content related to their athletic experience, market
their business ideas related to their sport and much more”). Keller provides the example of
Clark Hazlett, former quarterback for Division III Linfield University who had more than
150,000 subscribers on YouTube, as an example of a Division III athlete who would be
213
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complimented by a second popular pro-NCAA argument that asserts the
NCAA is integral to bringing professional scouts to practices and games
to aid athletes in demonstrating their skills and getting discovered by
professional teams. 218
Both of these concerns are addressed by empirical data. 219 First, while
there is no reliable metric to gauge the amount of collegiate athletes who
do not desire to ascend to the professional level in their sport, it is a fact
that of the more than 500,000 NCAA student athletes, less than 2% will
play professionally in their sport. 220 This percentage fluctuates depending
on the sport, but men’s college basketball at 1.2% and women’s college
basketball at 0.8% rank among the lowest chances of a student athlete
making it to the professional level.221 For the student athletes who “go pro
in something other than sports,” in accordance with the language of the
NCAA’s mission statement, 222 “the experiences of college athletics and
the life lessons [student athletes] learn along the way will help them as
they pursue careers in business, education, athletics administration,
communications, law, medicine and many more fields,” and “studentathletes graduate at higher rates than their peers in the student body.” 223

able to significantly benefit from NIL even if they weren’t a household name or a star on
the field. Id.
218
See id. But see ABNewswire, Olumide Stephen Adeyemi of High Level Connects More
NCAA Division 1 Players to NBA Scouts, VIRTUAL-STRATEGY MAGAZINE (Jan. 25, 2022),
https://virtual-strategy.com/2022/01/25/olumide-stephen-adeyemi-of-high-level-connects
-more-ncaa-division-1-players-to-nba-scouts/ (describing how former collegiate basketball
athlete and founder of High Level, Olumide Stephen Adeyemi, has worked directly with
NBA Scouts since 2019 to help young male and female basketball players get discovered
in the hopes that this exposure will help boost their chances of playing at the professional
level).
219
See generally NCAA Guide for the College-Bound Student Athlete 2021-2022, infra
note 220 (explaining that the statistical data and percentages show that smaller Division I,
II, and III schools will not only benefit from NIL, but also student athletes will not
experience a decreased opportunity to play professionally in their sports).
220
NCAA Guide for the College-Bound Student Athlete 2021-2022, NCAA.ORG,
http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/eligibility_center/Student_Resources/CBSA.pdf?j=84410714&sf
mc_sub=832316830&l=7842029_HTML&u=737480787&mid=10892399&jb=5
(last
visited Oct. 29, 2022).
221
See id. (illustrating that while other sports have a higher percentage of players that
reach the professional level than men’s and women’s college basketball, the majority of
major NCAA sports have below a 10% chance of its student athletes playing professionally
in their respective sport).
222
See NCAA Mission and Vision Statements Analysis, supra note 7 (noting that the
stated purpose of the NCAA in relation to the services it provides student athletes is to help
its student athletes become the next well-rounded and educated leaders of the world in a
variety of fields outside the world of sports).
223
See NCAA Guide for the College-Bound Student Athlete 2021-2022, supra note 220
(emphasizing that what the NCAA advertises to its potential student athletes is a holistic
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Thus, while college superstars such as University of Alabama freshman
quarterback and 2021 Heisman Trophy winner Bryce Young have already
cashed in on their NIL rewards, 224 it remains to be seen if the average
college athlete will in fact be impacted monetarily by Alston in a
meaningful way if they attend a mid-major or smaller Division I, Division
II or Division III school. 225
A possible answer to the questions of where and how far studentathlete compensation may range comes mere months after the Alston
decision in Johnson v. NCAA, a suit filed by a former Villanova University
football player, Ralph “Trey” Johnson, which initially commenced as a
class action in November 2019 and eventually reached the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania in August 2021. 226 Later joined by a collection of former
and current collegiate student athletes, the student-athlete plaintiffs
claimed “that as college athletes they were employees of their respective
institutions and that the NCAA was their joint employer,” and in turn, the
student athletes argued they were owed “a required minimum wage
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).” 227 The student athletes
also assert that the NCAA functions as a “joint employer controlling
college sports” as additional justification for their employee compensation
argument. 228
betterment of their academic and athletic prowess in accordance with a unique college
education experience).
224
See Elizabeth Karpen, Alabama QB Bryce Young Making “Ungodly” Income from
NIL Deals, NY POST (July 20, 2021), https://nypost.com/2021/07/20/alabama-qb-ismaking-ungodly-amounts-from-nil-deals/ (explaining that the nineteen-year-old Alabama
quarterback represented by Creative Artist Agency who had never played a down of college
football at the time of the Alston decision, accrued nearly $1 million in endorsement deals
through his NIL prior to the 2021-2022 season).
225
See generally Jodi S. Balsam, What NCAA v. Alston Means for Professional Sports
Leagues, HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. (Aug. 26, 2021), https://harvardjsel.com/wpcontent/uploads/sites/9/2021/08/Balsam-Alston-essay.pdf (noting that the import of the
Alston decision may potentially bring “the availability of greater education-related
benefits, such as graduate school and study abroad, coupled with the state-by-state
legislative revolution empowering student-athletes to exploit their names, images, and
likenesses”).
226
See Michael McCann, NCAA Athletes-as-Employees Case Heads to Federal Appeals
Court, YAHOO SPORTS.COM (Jan. 4, 2022, 9:01 PM), https://sports.yahoo.com/judgeinvites-appellate-review-ncaa-050142141.html?fr=yhssrp_catchall (explaining that the
student athletes in Johnson urged the district court to recognize them as employees
deserving minimum wage since the FLSA, “a federal law that guarantees minimum wage
and overtime pay” to employees, allows this to be set as a plausible claim).
227
See Chris Lucca & David Singh, NCAA and Multiple Member Schools Seek Instant Replay
Review by Third Circuit, LAW.COM (Oct. 27, 2021, 11:13 AM), https://www.law.com/thelegal
intelligencer/2021/10/27/ncaa-and-multiple-member-schools-seek-instant-replay-reviewby-third-circuit/?slreturn=20220010025237.
228
See McCann, supra note 226. This argument by the student athletes of the NCAA
being a joint employer” mirrors the Court in Alston finding that despite the NCAA’s
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Agreeing with the student athletes, Judge Padova in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania denied a motion to dismiss filed by the schools of
the student-athlete plaintiffs and the NCAA—rejecting several of their
arguments that centered around college athletes being amateurs—and
ultimately finding that the plaintiffs plausibly pleaded that they were
sufficiently deemed employees under the FLSA. 229 Judge Padova further
noted that the Supreme Court had already dispelled this type of
amateurism argument in Alston and echoed Justice Kavanaugh’s
concurring opinion in Alston, highlighting that “the argument ‘that
colleges may decline to pay student athletes because the defining features
of college sports . . . is that the student athletes are not paid . . . is circular
and unpersuasive.’” 230 Judge Padova cut deeper into the NCAA’s
argument by making it clear that he found it “telling that college athletes
‘schedule classes around their required NCAA athletic activities,’ and
coaches arguably act more like bosses than professors.” 231 After their
motion to dismiss was denied, the schools and the NCAA appealed to the
Third Circuit to reverse Judge Padova’s holding and find that student
athletes cannot be employees under the FLSA or applicable state laws.232
On November 8, 2021, after three months of deliberation, a twentyeight-person Constitutional Committee chaired by former U.S. Secretary
of Defense Robert Gates unveiled a newly worked NCAA Constitution,
which pulls power away from the NCAA’s central governance and gives
it to the three divisions to manage student-athlete compensation for NIL. 233
classification as a “joint venture,” it is still subject to antitrust scrutiny under the Rule of
Reason analysis. See Miller, supra note 199 and accompanying text.
229
See Lucca & Singh, supra note 227. Judge Padova’s decision at the district court level
sent shockwaves across the nation because for the first time ever and after failing repeatedly
throughout the twentieth century, student athletes obtained a victory in federal court to be
named employees of the NCAA under the FLSA. Id.
230
Lucca & Singh, supra note 227 (citing NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2167 (2021)
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (highlighting that the Alston decision is already being cited as
precedent in notable cases such as Johnson for which of the NCAA’s argument may be
redeemable, if any, after being struck down by Justice Gorsuch and the Court in Alston).
231
McCann, supra note 226. Judge Padova’s recognition of the responsibilities and rigors
of student-athlete life on and off the field as well as the time management skills necessary
to meet all of their academic and athletic requirements added to the analogy that they are
employees and the coaches act like their bosses. Id.
232
Id. With the Third Circuit appeal by the schools and NCAA still pending, student
athletes and those who support them hope for a favorable result in accordance with Judge
Padova’s ruling at the district court level in granting student athletes employment status
under the FLSA. Id.
233
See Dennis Dodd, NCAA Unveils Modernized Constitution Draft with Divisions Granted
Increased Governing Power, CBSSPORTS.COM (Nov. 8, 2021, 12:45 PM),
https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/ncaa-unveils-modernized-constitutiondraft-with-divisions-granted-increased-governing-power/; see also Maria Carrasco, The
New NCAA Constitution Hints at Big Changes Ahead, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Nov. 9,
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Born out of the antitrust concerns raised in Alston months earlier, this
Constitution provides that student athletes “may receive educational
benefits and benefit from commercialization through the use of their name,
image and likeness in accordance with guidelines established by their
NCAA division.” 234 While activity largely remained status quo between
the Alston decision and this new proposal, should this draft of the NCAA
Constitution be accepted, the NCAA bylaw prohibiting student athletes
from accepting monetary compensation in exchange for the utilization of
their NIL may cease to exist. 235

CONCLUSION: THE NCAA’S LAST STAND AND A NEW AGE OF
INTERCOLLEGIATE GOVERNANCE
Standing on the shoulders of decades of challenges to various aspects
of the NCAA’s restrictions and governance of student athletes since Board
of Regents and matching the trend of states passing Fair Pay to Play
legislation, the Court gifted student athletes an antitrust victory that will
change the course of intercollegiate sports forever.236 The Court for the
first time definitively rejected the NCAA’s “amateurism” argument that
has remained at the core of its hub-and-spoke cartel since its inception in
1906 and has been a justification for the NCAA’s regulations for over a
century. 237 The NCAA’s long-held control over student athletes’ NIL has
eroded amidst the crashing waves of antitrust litigation over the last half
century, and it is possible that the Alston decision was the wave that
irreparably cracked the NCAA’s solidified foundation. 238
2021), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2021/11/09/ncaa-draft-constitution-aimsrestructure-divisions (explaining that under the new draft, “each division would have the
authority to organize itself . . . and create new divisions or subdivisions” as well as
“determine [the] governing structure and membership eligibility for new organizations”).
234
See Ishan K. Bhabha, David Sussman & Allison Douglis, United States: Update on
Proposed Changes to the NCAA Constitution, MONDAQ (Nov. 24, 2021),
https://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/education/1134442/update-on-proposed-changesto-the-ncaa-constitution- (citing Robert M. Gates, Draft of the New NCAA Constitution,
NCAA.ORG (Nov. 8, 2021), https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/governance/ncaa/
constitution/NCAAGov_DraftConstitution.pdf).
235
See id. (noting the importance of the NCAA’s new constitutional amendment in
determining the scope of the Alston decision and its applicability to student athletes in the
coming years).
236
See supra Part II.B.
237
See Litan, supra note 145 and accompanying text (highlighting that the NCAA’s lack
of a clear definition for “amateur” and its constantly evolving nature throughout the
twentieth and twenty-first centuries played a significant role in the Supreme Court rejecting
the NCAA’s procompetitive amateurism justification in Alston).
238
See supra Part II.A.
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As the general public adjusts to the Alston decision and most recently
the Johnson decision on appeal to the Third Circuit, the ability for student
athletes to receive education-related benefits is just the beginning of a
long, overdue push to allow college athletes to monetize their NIL. 239
Donald H. Yee, a lawyer and partner with Yee & Dubin Sports and
representative of professional athletes and coaches, argues the Alston
decision may “revolutionize the American sports industry, and in turn, . . .
positively affect a lot of lives.” 240 For others, the Alston decision marks
the beginning of the fall of the NCAA empire and with it, the death of
amateur sports as we know it. 241
In the coming years, this Note argues that Justice Kavanaugh’s
concurrence in Alston advocating to expand the scope of activities studentathletes can profit off of will become a reality, and the NCAA will
eventually cease to exist in its current form, leaving the conferences free
to start a new era in collegiate sports.242 Since the conferences compete
with each other, their administration of compensation restraints would
comply with § 1 of the Sherman Act in contrast to the NCAA’s clear price
fixing and horizontal restraints on trade in the student-athlete labor
market. 243
In accordance with the new era of conference-controlled collegiate
sports, athletes at smaller schools who participate in low-revenue grossing
sports such as lacrosse, water polo, and tennis will begin to garner
attention from brick-and-mortar stores looking for an athlete endorsement
deal. 244 This relationship between athletes in low-revenue sports and
See Marino, supra note 209 (emphasizing that the Alston decision, regardless of how
far it went in terms of providing NIL benefits to student athletes, has been decades in the
making as the antitrust defenses of the NCAA slowly withered away since the Board of
Regents decision in 1984).
240
Donald H. Yee, The Supreme Court’s NCAA Ruling Will Turn Sports Upside Down.
Here’s How., WASH. POST (Jun. 22, 2021, 11:47 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
outlook/2021/06/22/ncaa-football-alston-ruling/.
241
See supra Part III.B. For those who wish to protect the purity of college amateur
athletics and refuse to accept the prospect of student athletes receiving any form of
compensation past their grant-in-aid tuition, the writing is on the wall with the Alston
decision, and there is likely no plausible return the NCAA may make from this resounding
defeat at the Supreme Court level. Id.
242
See supra Part V (explaining that with the NCAA creating a hole in the NCAA’s onceformidable dam, each subsequent antitrust suit by student athletes in the future will use the
Alston decision as precedent to continue to chip away at the NCAA’s dam until the
floodgates fully open and the NCAA cedes its control over compensation restraints to the
conferences).
243
See generally Ruseki, Reilly & Humphreys, supra note 26 and accompanying text.
244
See generally Alan Blinder, The Smaller, Everyday Deals for College Athletes Under
New Rules, NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 9, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/
12/09/sports/ncaafootball/college-athletes-nil-deals.html (noting that the superstar student
athletes in the highest revenue-grossing sports with national notoriety publicized their NIL
239
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brick-and-mortar stores will be especially prevalent in colleges and
universities located in smaller rural communities which lack chain
restaurants and larger stores. 245
The NCAA now sits on the hill in which it will make its last stand, and
much like Colonel Custer leading the 7th Cavalry Regiment at the Battle
of the Little Bighorn in Montana in one of the worst American military
disasters in history, 246 if the NCAA had relinquished its iron-grip on
student athletes earlier, the war with student athletes may have ended in
peace. 247 Does today’s NCAA match Teddy Roosevelt’s vision when he
gathered the Ivy League schools together in a meeting to save the integrity
of college athletics? 248 Regardless of the answer to that question, the
Alston Court has now joined the societal masses knocking down the once
great statue of the NCAA and, from the rubble, building a new governing
body for college sports where student athletes may benefit from their NIL
without restriction. 249

endorsements with major brands such as Gatorade and Nike, but student athletes in lowerrevenue grossing sports will have more NIL endorsement opportunities as it becomes
integrated into the culture of their schools).
245
See generally Austin Green, How Local Businesses, College Athletes Are Taking
Advantage of the NIL Era, NAT’L CTR. FOR BUS. JOURNALISM (Oct. 20, 2021),
https://businessjournalism.org/2021/10/how-local-businesses-college-athletes-are-takingadvantage-of-the-nil-era/ (explaining that there is an untapped market in rural towns with
loyal sports fans where a lesser-known student athlete may be able to secure an
endorsement deal with a local establishment in their town outside the chain establishments
that are supporting the top players in the highest revenue-grossing sports).
246
See generally Annette McDermott, What Really Happened at the Battle of Little
Bighorn?, HISTORY.COM, https://www.history.com/news/little-bighorn-battle-facts-causes
(last updated Jun. 7, 2019).
247
See, e.g., Eric Jackson, Free Labor from Georgia Student-Athletes May Soon Come
to an End, ATLANTA BUSINESS CHRONICLE (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.bizjournals.com/
atlanta/news/2019/10/23/free-labor-from-georgia-student-athletes-may-soon.html?iana=h
pmvp_atl_news_headline.
248
See NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2148 (2021). The answer to this question is
likely a resounding “No!” as the NCAA has wholly lost sight of Teddy Roosevelt’s vision
for competitive balance and player safety in the Ivy Leagues and instead exchanged this
for stringent restrictions and a fixation on price fixing in the student-athlete cognizable
labor market. Id.
249
See supra Part III.B. With not only sports fans but also academics, labor rights
activists, and employment scholars backing the student athlete plaintiffs in Alston and more
recently in Johnson, the court of public opinion is in line with the Supreme Court’s decision
in removing the NCAA’s power over student-athlete compensation restraints one judicial
opinion at a time. Id.

